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SEXUAL ASSAULT BY FEDERAL ACTORS, #METOO,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Julie Goldscheid*
Abstract: Calls for accountability for gender violence have permeated public discourse in
the aftermath of the #MeToo movement. While much attention has focused on high profile
individuals accused of harassment, less attention has been paid to sexual assaults of more
vulnerable and marginalized people, including low wage workers, lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and gender non-conforming people, and immigrants. In addition, at the same time
that calls for accountability have targeted Hollywood, employers, universities, and even the
Catholic church, relatively little outcry has focused on the longstanding and under-recognized
problem of sexual assaults by government actors. This Article focuses on sexual assault by
federal officials and considers, in particular, sexual assault of immigrants, including people
living in or traveling to the United States to seek asylum.
The #MeToo movement rightly has focused attention on the need for accountability by
those who commit and facilitate gender violence. It has created a valuable moment for
reflection and advocacy for laws and policies focused on prevention and on redress for victims
and survivors.1 Social science makes clear that strong leadership and policies and practices
holding both institutions and individuals accountable are key. Civil remedies, including
remedies under civil rights laws, are an essential tool in the mix of needed responses. But
advocacy efforts have not focused on the federal government’s civil rights accountability for
sexual assault committed by those who act in the federal government’s name. The Bivens
doctrine, which provides the avenue of redress for sexual assaults by federal officials as
violations of constitutional rights, has been increasingly narrowed. It provides no mechanism
for institutional accountability; with respect to individual accountability, the Supreme Court
recently declared that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”2
This Article uses calls for reform of sexual harassment laws as a point of comparison and
demonstrates that the federal government’s liability for sexual assault and harassment falls
short of emerging accountability norms. It argues that the limits on federal accountability are
not justified by traditional policy concerns, such as federal officials’ policy-making
prerogatives and concerns about financial burdens. This historical moment calls for revisiting
outdated legal doctrines to bring them in line with current understandings of accountability, so
that our legal frameworks better advance fairness and equality.
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1. This Article uses the terms “victims” and “survivors” to refer to those impacted by gender
violence, acknowledging that not all who are affected survive, and that some who do, do not consider
themselves “victims.”
2. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 675 (1937)).
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INTRODUCTION
Calls for accountability for gender violence have permeated public
discourse in the aftermath of the #MeToo movement. The 2017
presidential inauguration triggered unprecedented crowds protesting
gender violence at the Women’s Marches.3 An outpouring of revelations
and public reckoning with sexual harassment in a range of contexts
galvanized the #MeToo movement. While much attention has focused on
3. See generally Scott Malone & Ginger Gibson, Women Lead Unprecedented Worldwide Mass
Protests Against Trump, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpwomen-idUSKBN15608K [https://perma.cc/6JYF-F5M5].
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high profile individuals accused of harassment, less attention has been
paid to sexual assaults of more vulnerable and marginalized people,
including low wage workers, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and
gender non-conforming people, people of color, and immigrants. In
particular, while calls for accountability have targeted Hollywood,
employers, universities, and even the Catholic church, relatively little
outcry has focused on the longstanding and under-recognized problem of
sexual assaults by government actors. The problem of gender violence
addressed by the #MeToo movement encompasses a continuum that
includes sexual harassment at work, intimate partner violence, and sexual
assault.4 To truly advance the goal of ending gender violence, advocacy
and law reform should address gender violence in all its forms and contexts.
In this time of aggressive enforcement of federal immigration policies,
sexual assaults by federal agents of immigrants, including people living
in or traveling to the United States to seek asylum, are particularly
troubling.5 Remedies for these violations, particularly to redress the harms
as civil rights violations, are uncertain at best. Particularly egregious
examples have received some press attention,6 but the issue is not a focus
of media and advocacy campaigns, or of calls for law reform stemming
from the #MeToo movement. That omission may be for good reason,
given the increasingly limited scope of relief under the doctrine
established under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,7 and under 42
U.S.C. § 19838—the two primary vehicles for civil rights accountability
against federal and state actors, respectively.9 Longstanding advocacy
efforts have sought to frame gender violence as a civil rights violation,
both to recast what historically had been seen as private violence as a
matter of public concern and to establish mechanisms for accountability.10
The spotlight shone on gender violence in the wake of the #MeToo
movement suggests that the time may be ripe for reform.
The #MeToo movement has rightly focused public attention on the
4. This paper uses the terminology “gender violence” to generally reference this range of behavior.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See generally Manny Fernandez, They Were Stopped at the Texas Border. Their Nightmare Had
Only Just Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/rape-texasborder-immigrants-esteban-manzanares.html [https://perma.cc/QM2S-3LB4]; Laura Gottesdiener et
al., ‘A Border Control Official Sexually Abused Me’, NATION (June 4–11, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/im-never-going-to-let-what-happened-to-me-happen-to-mydaughter/ [https://perma.cc/4JH3-AL2R].
7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra notes 53–56, section III.A.
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need for accountability by those who commit and facilitate gender
violence. The notion of accountability itself is complex, challenging us to
consider what legal, policy, and cultural changes are needed to truly end
gender violence. A wide range of responses are needed. These must
include efforts to shift cultural norms, including public education
campaigns, meaningful employment policies and ongoing training, and
workplace education programs.11 Emerging and promising practices
explore dispute resolution processes that are educational rather than
punitive and that take into account the pervasiveness of gender and other
forms of subordination as a baseline part of our culture.12 Experts
increasingly concur that best practices for prevention require strong
leadership at the top that makes clear that sexual harassment and other
forms of bias will not be tolerated, and that makes that promise real by
holding those who discriminate to account.13
Civil remedies, including remedies under civil rights laws, are an
essential tool in the mix of needed legal responses.14 These remedies
should address both institutional and individual accountability.15
However, the standards for civil rights-based accountability for gender
violence are not consistent across settings and the differences are not
11. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (June 2016), [hereinafter EEOC Task Force
Report], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm#_Toc453686310
[https://perma.cc/LL4X-XAE6] (reviewing efforts to end sexual harassment and enumerating
suggestions for training and other initiatives to address the problem).
12. See generally Deborah T. Eisenberg, The Restorative Workplace: An Organizational Learning
Approach to Discrimination, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 487 (2016) (discussing the potential application of
restorative practices to prevent and address workplace discrimination); Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K.
Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up and Theories of Justice, 45 U. Ill. L. Rev. 45
(2019) (considering the use of restorative justice practices in the workplace). For materials exploring
the application of restorative justice principals to gender violence in other contexts, see, for example,
Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV.
147 (2016) (discussing potential use of restorative justice in tandem with public health approaches,
to address sexual assault on campus); LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
136–41 (Clare M. Renzetti ed., 2018); JAMES PTACEK, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN (Claire Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2010); HEATHER STRANG & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite
eds., 2002); PROJECT NIA: BUILDING PEACEFUL COMMUNITIES, http://project-nia.org
[https://perma.cc/WSH7-XBGX].
13. See infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Open Letter on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination
Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 17–18 (2018) [hereinafter Schultz, Open Letter],
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-statement-on-sexual-harassment-fromemployment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https://perma.cc/C7G5-E6W9] (“We know that law alone
cannot create change. Yet we know also that change rarely occurs without the law.”); see infra notes
53–57, section III.A., and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 233–234 and accompanying text.
THE
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necessarily warranted by the differences in context.16 The increased
visibility of sexual harassment and assault occasioned by the #MeToo
movement raises important questions about whether the differences in
liability schemes are justified by those differences in context.
This Article focuses on one set of contrasts: the civil rights-based
standards for holding individuals and institutions liable for sexual assault
and harassment committed by federal actors, and the civil rights-based
liability standard for harassment committed at work.17 I have selected
these contexts to contrast the sharp limitations in civil rights
accountability for sexual assault by federal officials with the employmentbased norms foregrounded by the #MeToo movement. Using calls for
reform of employment discrimination law as a point of comparison, the
Article demonstrates that the federal government’s liability for sexual
harassment and sexual assault committed by its officials falls far short of
emerging accountability norms, and that the limitations are not justified
by traditional policy concerns such as federal officials’ policy-making
prerogatives and concerns about financial burdens. These shortfalls
illustrate the unnecessary constraint of civil rights law’s current reach in
other contexts as well, though accountability in those other contexts is
beyond the scope of this Article. This Article argues that this historic
moment calls for revisiting legal doctrines to bring them in line with
current conceptions of accountability, so that our legal frameworks better
advances fairness and equality.
Part I reviews the problem of gender violence, specifically sexual
assault, committed by federal officials. It draws on reports of sexual
assaults by federal law enforcement officers of asylum seekers and others
at the border, especially people of color, lesbian, gay, bisexual and
16. As but one example, the standard for institutional liability for sexual harassment in schools is
not the same as the standard for sexual harassment at work, and many of the differences are subject
to sharp critique. See generally Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 78 MONT. L. REV. 109 (2017); Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For
the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J.
(2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/for-the-title-ix-civil-rights-movementcongratulations-and-cautions [https://perma.cc/8PNL-HAF2]; Fatima G. Graves, Restoring Effective
protections for Students against Sexual Harassment in Schools: Moving Beyond the Gebser and Davis
Standards
(2015),
https://www.nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ACS-Article-MovingBeyond-Gebser-and-Davis-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PNL-HAF2].
17. By contrasting federal civil rights accountability with workplace accountability under Title VII,
this Article focuses on civil rights remedies available across contexts for sexual assaults committed
by federal actors; it does not analyze context-specific statutory remedies such as the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012); sexual assault by federal employees, 5 U.S.C. § 8101
(2012); or the limits of the doctrine holding state actors accountable for sexual assault under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012); see also infra notes 131, 142, 149, 163, 164, 167 (discussing cases brought against
state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for sexual assault).
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transgender migrants, domestic violence victims and survivors,18 and
other members of marginalized groups. Part II reviews the legal remedies
available to survivors of sexual assault by federal officials, and focuses on
civil rights recourse, as distinct from other potential remedies such as tort
law. While there is some overlap in the remedies available under both
schemes, civil rights frameworks more accurately capture the dignitary
nature of the harm and should be part of the range of remedies available
to redress constitutional harms. This Part discusses the applicability of the
Bivens doctrine,19 the damages remedy for redressing constitutional
violations by federal actors, to cases of sexual assault by federal actors. It
argues that a Bivens remedy should be available to redress sexual assault
under the current doctrine, but that recent trends render recovery uncertain.
Part III turns to the contrasting liability scheme for gender violence
committed in employment. It summarizes the framework for liability
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and analogous
state and local employment laws, as well as reforms enacted and proposed
in the wake of the #MeToo movement. These reform efforts, supported
by social science data on best practices for sexual harassment prevention,
highlight the importance of strong accountability measures for both
individuals who commit the harm, and the institutions that foster and
countenance it. Social science confirms the importance of creating
institutional policies and practices making clear that sexual harassment,
assault, and other forms of bias are unacceptable, and of creating
accessible and meaningful avenues for complaint.
Part IV compares the respective accountability schemes and
demonstrates that the scheme for federal accountability falls short of
meaningful accountability norms. In particular, Bivens’s flat preclusion of
direct institutional accountability for sexual assaults by federal agents
flies in the face of the lessons from social science underscoring the
importance of strong institutional, as well as individual, accountability
measures. The preclusion of institutional accountability, in addition to the
constrained doctrine holding individuals accountable, is out of step with
best practices for accountability and prevention, and is not justified by
considerations of policy, cost or deterrence.

18. This article uses the term “survivor” and “victim” to refer to those impacted by gender violence,
acknowledging that not all who are impacted by gender violence survive, and that some who do
survive do not consider themselves “victims.”
19. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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I.

BACKGROUND: GENDER VIOLENCE AT THE HANDS OF
FEDERAL AGENTS

In contrast to the wave of reports of sexual assaults by myriad highprofile individuals in industries ranging from entertainment to politics to
sports,20 reports of sexual assaults by border agents and other federal law
enforcement officers have received relatively little public attention. Of
course, violence by law enforcement is not limited to abuse by federal
officers or against immigrants; longstanding advocacy has sought to
address sexual assault and other abuses by federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers.21
With respect to sexual assaults by federal officials, reports reveal
shocking accounts of abuse by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
agents.22 These reports include documentation of sexual abuse by federal
20. For a sampling of accounts stemming from the #MeToo movement, see, for example, Lesley
Wexler, Jennifer Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 45 U.
ILL. L. REV. 45, 48–53; Alyssa Milano, Cyntoia Brown’s Case Shows Where #MeToo Must Head
Next, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019, 3:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cyntoiabrowns-case-shows-where-metoo-must-head-next/2019/01/09/900bdec0-142f-11e9-b6ad9cfd62db
b0a8_story.html?utm_term=.d4972e4871ff [https://perma.cc/6S2A-SUEM]; Salamishah Tillet &
Scheherazade Tillet, After the ‘Surviving R. Kelly’ Documentary, #MeToo Has Finally Returned to
Black Girls, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/opinion/r-kellydocumentary-metoo.html [https://perma.cc/EC64-FUY7].
21. See generally ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK
WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017); Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and
the Perpetuation of Sexual Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (2014); Michelle S. Jacobs,
The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police Violence, 24 WM. & MARY J.
RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 39, 69 (2017); Cara McClellan, The Deafening Silence Around Police
Violence Against Black Women And Girls, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-mcclellan-black-womenpolice_us_5aeb5b6be4b0ab5c3d634fd5 [https://perma.cc/4XG5-LDD3]; see also, e.g., Doe v. City
of New York, No. 15-CV-0117 (AJN), 2018 WL 6095847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2018) (partially
denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable juror could find that
New York City “exhibited deliberate indifference in its investigation and discipline practices and that
this deliberate indifference caused Doe to be sexually assaulted” at the detention center on
Riker’s island).
22. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, Border Patrol Agents Rarely Disciplined in Abuse Cases, Records
Show, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2014, 9:16 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-force20140510-story.html [https://perma.cc/59FL-Y9HR] (reporting “little accountability” for complaints
of abuses, including sexual abuse, against Border Patrol agents); Mark Dow, Sex Abuse and
Homeland Security, CRIME REPORT (May 12, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/05/12/sex-andthe-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/XU6Z-EUK4] (detailing complaints against Customs and Border
Protection); Sylvanna Falcón, “National Security” and the Violation of Women: Militarized Border
Rape at the US-Mexico Border, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 119–29
(INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006) (documenting rapes at the border);
Fernandez, supra note 6 (detailing sexual assault of fourteen-year-old undocumented immigrant, her
friend and the friend’s mother who were sexually and physically assaulted by border patrol agent, and
detailing challenges of recovering through civil claims); Anna Werner & Laura Strickler,
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actors of unaccompanied children.23 Sexual abuse is also rife in
immigration detention.24 LGBTQ immigrants and immigrant detainees are
“Disturbing” Sex Abuse Within Agency that Patrols U.S. Border, Says Former Top Official, CBS
NEWS (May 4, 2015, 7:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-border-patrol-has-a-sex-abuseproblem-says-whistleblower/ [https://perma.cc/2VW4-542E] (reporting that Customs Border
Protection received 285 documented complaints or allegations related to sexual abuse since 2009);
see generally NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, STRANDED: FORCED MIGRATION, ILLEGAL BARRIERS TO
ASYLUM, AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN TIJUANA (July 2019), https://www.nlg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/NLG-Tijuana-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2K2-J8KY]; Garrett
M. Graff, The Border Patrol Hits a Breaking Point, POLITICO (July 15, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/15/border-patrol-trump-administration-227357
[https://perma.cc/U63A-5T6B].
23. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCH. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (ACLU) BORDER LITIG. PROJECT & ACLU BORDER RIGHTS, NEGLECT AND ABUSE OF
UNACCOMPANIED
IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN
24–27
(May
2018),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ihrc
[https://perma.cc/D96G-E4Z4] (detailing pervasiveness of sexual abuse of immigrant children in
custody notwithstanding Department of Homeland Security adoption of Prison Rape Elimination Act
(PREA) regulations in March 2014, and its subsequent “zero tolerance” policy). See generally Mitra
Ebadolahi, CBP Fails to Discredit our Report on Abuse of Immigrant Kids, ACLU (May 31, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/cbp-fails-discredit-ourreport-abuse-immigrant (rebutting Customs and Border Protections response to report); Mitra
Ebadolahi, The Border Patrol was Monstrous Under Obama. Imagine How Bad it is Under Trump,
SPEAK FREELY (May 23, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrolabuses/border-patrol-was-monstrous-under-obama-imagine
[https://perma.cc/FK74-UHBT];
Matthew Haag, Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They were Sexually Abused in U.S. Detention
Centers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/immigr
ant-children-sexual-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/EJ9N-U24K]; Emily Kassie, Sexual Assault Inside
ICE Detention: 2 Survivors Tell Their Stories, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/us/sexual-assault-ice-detention-survivor-stories.html
[https://perma.cc/S86Q-7HN8].
24. See, e.g., Doe v. Neveleff, No. A-11-CV-907-LY, 2013 WL 489442, at *4–9 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
8, 2013) (detailing reports and history of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s failure to protect
detainees in custody from sexual assault); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (USCCR), WITH LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 70–
90 (2015), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3MM-363B] (finding lack of accountability in complying with the Prison Rape
Elimination Act of 2003); NO MORE DEATHS/NO MÁS MUERTES, A CULTURE OF CRUELTY, ABUSE
AND IMPUNITY IN SHORT-TERM U.S. BORDER PATROL CUSTODY 8–13 (2002) [hereinafter NO MORE
DEATHS/NO MÁS MUERTES], http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Issues2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS88-K97G] (identifying sexual and physical abuse and assault, as well
as psychological, emotional, and physical abuse, as “systemic and widespread” practices); Falcón,
supra note 22, at 119 (detailing accounts of rape by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or
Border Patrol agents and arguing that rape is routinely and systematically used by the state in
militarization efforts at the border); Michael Grabell, Topher Sanders & Silvina Sterin Pensel, In
Immigrant Children’s Shelters, Sexual Assault Cases are Open and Shut, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21,
2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/boystown-immigrant-childrens-shelter-sexual-assault
[https://perma.cc/TH93-ZDC9]; Alice Speri, Detained, then Violated, INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/immigration-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/
[https://perma.cc/AKR2-AG5B] (detailing ongoing pattern of abuse in immigration detention,
particularly by Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees); Tina Vasquez, Texas Detention

08 - Goldscheid (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1/16/2020 3:51 PM

2019] SEXUAL ASSAULT, FEDERAL ACTORS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1647
particularly targeted.25 Despite efforts, such as the Department of Homeland
Security’s adoption of regulations prohibiting sexual abuse,26 investigative
protocols for allegations of sexual abuse or assault,27 and CBP’s adoption of
a so-called “zero tolerance” policy,28 the problem persists.29
Center Faces Allegations of Widespread Sexual Abuse—Again, REWIRE NEWS (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://rewire.news/article/2017/11/22/texas-detention-center-faces-allegations-widespread-sexualabuse-again/ [https://perma.cc/4QTY-U846]. For additional accounts of sexual abuse in immigration
detention, see, for example, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND AT RISK: SEXUAL ABUSE AND
HARASSMENT IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION (Aug. 25, 2010), https://www.hrw.org
/report/2010/08/25/detained-and-risk/sexual-abuse-and-harassment-united-states-immigrationdetention [https://perma.cc/F9CU-QMSE]; WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM'N, BEHIND LOCKED DOORS:
ABUSE OF REFUGEE WOMEN AT THE KROME DETENTION CENTER (2000), https://www.womensref
ugeecommission.org/rights/gbv/resources/272-behind-locked-doors-abuse-of-refugee-women-atthe-krome-detention-center [https://perma.cc/UGQ4-8P7J].
25. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, USA: ‘YOU DON’T HAVE ANY RIGHTS HERE’: ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS
ARBITRARY DETENTION & ILL-TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 53–61
(2018), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/You-Dont-Have-Any-RightsHere.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAP3-W2CJ] (detailing mistreatment of trans asylum seekers); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, “DO YOU SEE HOW MUCH I’M SUFFERING HERE?”: ABUSE AGAINST TRANSGENDER
WOMEN IN US IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pd
f/us0316_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YP6-LJVA]; USCCR, supra note 24, at 38–39, 81–83 (detailing
ICE facilities’ violations of standards of care specific to LGBT detainees); Elise Foley, LGBT
Immigrant Detainees Reported Sexual Assault at Higher Rates, HUFFINGTON POST (May 31, 2018,
12:00 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ice-lgbtq-immigrant-detainees-sexualassault_us_
5b0daa5ce4b0fdb2aa5775a2 [https://perma.cc/3DPQ-ESJX] (reporting that Immigration Custom
Enforcement (ICE) detained transgender women in all-male facilities and locked them up on average
for more than twice as long as immigrants overall); Robert Moore, Gay, Transgender Detainees
Allege Abuse at ICE Facility in New Mexico, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/gay-transgender-detainees-allege-abuse-at-icefacility-in-new-mexico/2019/03/25/e33ad6b6-4f10-11e9-a3f778b7525a8d5f_story.html?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.b8f5f8f3246f [https://perma.cc/FPF6-6VAX] (recounting complaint of sexual
harassment and abuse of gay and transgender detainees at the Otero County Processing Center).
26. See 6 C.F.R. § 115 (2019); Sexual Abuse and Assault Prevention Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
13,165 (Mar. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 115).
27. Investigative Protocols for Allegations of Sexual Abuse and/or Assault, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SECURITY: U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cbp.gov/about/carein-custody/investigative-protocols-allegations-sexual-abuse-and-assault [https://perma.cc/3FXTP2ZR].
28. See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., MAY 2014 THROUGH DECEMBER 2015 SEXUAL
ABUSE AND ASSAULT IN HOLDING FACILITIES REPORT (Mar. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Apr/May%202014%20%20December%202015%20S
exual%20Abuse%20and%20Assault%20in%20Holding%20Facilities%20Report_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W6N-LKT4] (detailing reports of abuse after implementation of the Prison Rape
Elimination Act of 2003); CBP Policy on Zero Tolerance of Sexual Abuse and Assault, U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SECURITY: U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Feb. 27, 2019), (last modified Feb.
27, 2019), https://www.cbp.gov/employees/eeo/ztp/cbp-policy-zero-tolerance-sexual-abuse-andassault [https://perma.cc/463J-7BE7].
29. See, e.g., Doe v. Neveleff, No. A-11-CV-907-LY, 2013 WL 489442, at *4–9 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
8, 2013) (claiming widespread sexual abuse of detainees at Hutto facilities, and detailing reports of widespread
sexual abuse of detainees at other detention facilities, including lawsuits, dating back to 1998); GUILLERMO
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Violence by federal actors at the border compounds harm for many who
already have been subjected to violence and abuse. Many survivors were
subjected to gender-based violence in their home countries, and many
then suffered attacks along their journey to the U.S. border.30 Some
reports conclude that up to 80% of Central American girls and women
crossing the border from Mexico are raped along the way by criminal
gangs, traffickers, other migrants or corrupt officials.31
A few examples illustrate the gravity and impact of the problem. The
brutal treatment of three Honduran women by CBP officer Esteban
Manzanares has received some press attention; it has been described as

CANTOR & WALTER EWING., STILL NO ACTION TAKEN: COMPLAINTS AGAINST BORDER PATROL AGENTS
CONTINUE TO GO UNANSWERED (Aug. 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/fil
es/researh/still_no_action_taken_complaints_against_border_patrol_agents_continue_to_go_unanswered.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5XG-TTAG] (finding no action taken in 96% of cases in which a border patrol agent was
alleged to have engaged in misconduct and that three-fifths of complaints involved allegations of physical
abuse); USCCR, supra note 24, at 123 (concluding that practices may violate immigrants’ constitutional and
other rights); Letter from Rebecca Merton, Nat’l Indep. Monitor, CIVIC & Christina Fialho, Co-Founder/Exec.
Dir., CIVIC, to Thomas D. Homan, Dir. Claire Trickler-McNulty, Asstistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, et al. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a33042eb078691c386e7bce/t/5a9da29741
9202ab8be09c92/1520280217559/SexualAssault_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8Y4-RRBG] (detailing
prevalence of reports of sexual abuse, assault and harassment in U.S. immigration detention facilities, lack of
adequate investigation and government refusal to disclose relevant records) Government Documents Show
Customs & Border Protection Officials Have Abused Migrant Children, ACLU SAN DIEGO,
https://www.aclusandiego.org/cbp-child-abuse-foia/ [https://perma.cc/6HJE-RB7Q] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019)
(reviewing complaints filed with the Department of Homeland Security, and listing other similar complaints
dating back to 2008); Victoria López & Sandra Park, ICE Detention Center Says it’s not Responsible for Staff’s
Sexual Abuse of Detainees, ACLU (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrantsrights-and-detention/ice-detention-center-says-its-not-responsible [https://perma.cc/XGW3-KAPP] (reviewing
reports and detailing case in which an immigration detention center is arguing that a detainee “consented” to
sexual abuse by an employee); Widespread Sexual Assault, FREEDOM IMMIGRANTS,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/T5CV-Y6Q4] (citing federal
complaint filed with Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security
detailing the prevalence of reports of sexual abuse, assault and harassment in U.S. Immigration detention
facilities and detailing findings).
30. See, e.g., Gottesdiener et al, supra note 6; see infra note 31.
31. Deborah Bonello & Erin S. McIntyre, Is Rape the Price to Pay for Migrant Women Chasing the
American Dream?, SPLINTER (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:51 PM), https://splinternews.com/is-rape-the-price-to-pay-formigrant-women-chasing-the-1793842446 [https://perma.cc/AZ52-QDAJ] (reporting on interviews of directors
of migrant shelters); Eleanor Goldberg, 80% of Central American Women, Girls Are Raped Crossing Into the
U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2014, 9:27 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/12/centralamerica-migrants-rape_n_5806972.html [https://perma.cc/9DU7-QQXM]; see, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L,
INVISIBLE
VICTIMS:
MIGRANTS
ON
THE
MOVE
IN
MEXICO
15–18
(2010),
https://fusiondotnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/amr410142010eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UPS7-GXCD]
(citing reports concluding that as many as 60% of immigrants who pass through shelters have suffered sexual
assault during their journey); Chloe Reichel, Violence Against Women Crossing the Border, JOURNALIST’S
RESOURCE (Mar. 9, 2018), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/immigration/violence-womenillegal-immigrants-border [https://perma.cc/V7RK-F688] (collecting scholarship describing women’s
experiences on the migrant trail).
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being unusual for its “magnitude and horror,” but not for the nature of the
abuse.32 In that case, three women, M.D.C.G., her fourteen-year-old
daughter, and a second teenage girl, had surrendered to Manzanares when
they crossed the border.33 He locked the women in the back of his patrol
truck, drove them around for an hour or two, stopped the truck in a
wooded area, separated and raped both the mother and the daughter, slit
M.D.C.G.’s wrists and tried to break the daughter’s neck, leaving them to
die.34 He took the second teenager back to his apartment, stripped her
naked, bound her to a chair, stuffed a sock in her mouth, and raped her.35
After some time, both M.D.C.G. and her daughter were able to run to seek
help and encountered Border Patrol agents, who took each of them to the
hospital.36 A number of hours later, federal officials tracked down
Manzanares in his apartment, where he had brought and raped the other
teenager.37 After the FBI announced their presence, Manzanares shot and
killed himself.38
In a similar case, Aura Hernández fled Guatemala to come to the United
States after facing life-threatening violence at the hands of her husband,
and after hearing that domestic abuse wasn’t tolerated in the United
States.39 When she crossed the Rio Grande into Texas with her nephew,
she was apprehended by border agents and driven to a nearby CBP station,
where a supervisory border patrol agent directed obscenities toward her,
made derogatory comments about her breasts, leered at her, and then
insisted that she meet with him “in private” if she “ever want[ed] the boy

32. Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s Most Out-ofControl
Law
Enforcement
Agency,
POLITICO
(Nov./Dec.
2014),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220
[https://perma.cc/73HV-WQWT]; see also Fernandez, supra note 22 (reporting on Manzanares case).
The women brought claims against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
M.D.C.G. v. U.S., No 7:15-cv-00552, 2016 WL 6638845 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2016). Notably, all
claims based on the assault itself were dismissed based on the conclusion that Manzanares was not
acting in the scope of his employment. Id. at *9–10. On September 18, 2018, a court granted summary
judgment to the government on all but one negligent hiring and supervision claims. M.D.C.G. v. U.S.,
No 7:15-CV-552, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2018). On December 13, 2018, the court entered
final judgment on the previously dismissed claims, opening the door to appeals of the previous rulings.
Id. at 5. See infra notes 42–45, discussing FTCA claims.
33. Graff, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. M.D.C.G., slip op. at 1–2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2018).
39. Gottesdiener et al, supra note 6.
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to get out of here,” where he proceeded to sexually assault her.40 In similar
cases, the ACLU filed claims on behalf of two teenage Guatemalan sisters
who asked border agents for help after crossing the border, where they
were taken to a CBP field office and sexually assaulted.41
Although these and other egregious cases have generated accounts in
the press, and, in some cases, have led to litigation seeking redress, they
have not generated mainstream calls for civil rights-based reform. The
next Part reviews the legal remedies available to those who have been
subjected to sexual assaults by federal officials, with a focus on civil rights
redress. It argues that civil rights remedies for these violations matter, and
that the #MeToo movement provides an opportunity to drive reform.
II.

FEDERAL OFFICIALS’ CIVIL RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

A.

Overview

Survivors of gender violence by federal officials who are able to reveal
their stories and who have access to legal process may turn to tort or civil
rights claims should they choose to seek accountability by filing a civil
claim. They may be able to sue the federal government as a matter of tort
law under the Federal Tort Claims Act42 (FTCA), though recovery is only
available in limited circumstances.43 For example, claims may survive
despite the FTCA’s many exclusions when the act was deemed to have
been committed by a “federal law enforcement officer” and “within the

40. Id.
41. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, J.I. v. United States, No. 1:18-at-00185 (E.D. Cal.
Mar.
14,
2018),
https://cbpabusestest2.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/ji-v-usa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7BU-H5Y3]; Richard Winton, Sisters from Guatemala Claim Border Patrol Agent
Sexually
Assaulted
Them,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
22,
2017,
5:50
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-teen-border-patrol-sex-assault-20170322-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M7LQ-PFEC]; Letter from Angelica Salceda, Staff Att’y, ACLU of N. Cal., to the
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20170321-redacted_clarita_tort_claim.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV2MZHQJ] (redacting tort claims letter).
42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (2012). For a comprehensive discussion of the FTCA’s
application in cases of sexual assault by federal actors, see Gregory C. Sisk, Holding the Federal
Government Accountable for Sexual Assault, 104 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2019).
43. See infra notes 44–45.
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scope of employment,”44 or, under narrow and somewhat unpredictable
circumstances, for the government’s negligence in facilitating the assault.45
A survivor seeking to hold the individual who committed the assault
accountable under state tort law would face a number of challenges. First,
the claim would have to survive likely arguments that the officer was
entitled to qualified immunity.46 If the claim survives that defense, the
next question would be whether the act was deemed to have been
committed within the scope of federal employment; if it was, the Westfall
Act47 would treat that action as an action exclusively against the
government under the FTCA. In that case, the individual would be
absolved of liability and the claim against the government would be
subject to the FTCA limitations referenced above.48 If the act was not
deemed to have been conducted “in the scope of employment,” then the
officer could be sued in their personal capacity under state tort law.49
Should the claim succeed, the law would provide for monetary recovery,

44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346; Sisk, supra note 42, section II.A.3., for a discussion of how courts have
interpreted the “federal law enforcement officer” and “within the scope of employment”
requirements. Nevertheless, survivors harmed by someone who was not a law enforcement officer
may be able to argue that the harmful conduct also violated the Constitution, and therefore, would not
be subject to the FTCA exceptions, such as the discretionary-function exception otherwise bars many
claims. See, e.g., Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that
unconstitutional conduct falls outside the discretionary function exception to the FTCA); Limone v.
U.S., 579 F.3d 79, 102 (1st Cir. 2009) (same); see also Sisk, supra note 42, at 746–49 (discussing law
enforcement office exception). See infra sections II.B. and II.C. for a discussion of constitutional
claims.
45. See Sisk, supra note 42, at section II.A.4.
46. Claims brought under the FTCA would be subject to qualified immunity defenses as well,
though the Supreme Court has modified its availability for federal officers faced with a common law
tort suit. See Sisk, supra note 42, at 761–65. The qualified immunity defense insulates government
officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The
doctrine has been narrowed such that the Court is increasingly unlikely to find clearly established law
that would defeat the defense, and the doctrine increasingly is critiqued as failing to achieve its
intended policy aims. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). For a discussion of the current debate about the impact and viability of
qualified immunity, see generally Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity at Trial, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2065 (2018); Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. SAINT
THOMAS L.J. 477 (2011); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2
(2017); Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2012); see also Sisk, supra note 42, at 761–65.
48. See Sisk, supra note 42, at 761–65. Given the FTCA’s limitations, this effectively means that
survivors may seek damages under Bivens, or nothing.
49. See id. Of course, if the individual was fired, or arrested, they may have limited ability to pay
damages.
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subject to the availability of the individual’s assets.50 Although some cases
result in criminal prosecutions,51 the criminal justice process does not
directly redress the harm to survivors in the aftermath of abuse.52
Survivors may also pursue a case under civil rights law. Historically,
civil rights laws have played a significant role in advancing accountability
for discrimination. In particular, reframing sexual harassment as a form of
impermissible sex discrimination has been a cornerstone of efforts to shift
public awareness so that sexual harassment is seen as a public rather than
a private problem, and as a reflection of historic, entrenched, and outdated
gender stereotypes and subordination.53 Before courts recognized sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, some courts recognized
harassment as a tort or a breach of contract.54 As more courts addressed
the question—and as feminists argued that sexual harassment reflected
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 887 F.3d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 2018) (upholding civil rights
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) of probation officer who sexually assaulted probationers
under threat of putting them in jail); Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 998, 1000, 1001 (9th Cir.
2003) (upholding conviction for sexual assault and kidnapping when a border agent drove a young
woman into the desert, handcuffed her, told her to take off her clothes, and told her that he would
leave her in the desert if she did not perform oral sex on him—which she did, notwithstanding his
testimony that it was consensual); cf., e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997) (vacating
judgment reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for judge’s sexual assaults of judicial
employees and litigants).
52. Although restitution technically is generally available following a criminal conviction,
restitution is not always enforced and only covers out of pocket expenses. See, e.g., Restitution, Get
Help Bulletins for Crime Victims, NAT’L CTR. VICTIMS CRIME, http://victimsofcrime.org/help-forcrime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/restitution [https://perma.cc/X56Z-CJNE].
53. See, e.g., CARRIE N. BAKER, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT
(2008) (tracing history of sexual harassment movement); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (arguing that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual
Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (tracing evolution of cases recognizing sex harassment and
sex discrimination and arguing that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination because it
reflects and perpetuates gender stereotypes). For further discussion of sexual harassment as sex
discrimination, see, for example, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Re-written Opinion in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 309, 309–12 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) (urging
consideration of biases based on race, gender and other aspects of the historical and social context in
which sexual harassment occurs); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128
YALE L.J. 22, 22 (2018) (reasserting that sexual harassment is “more about sexism than it is about
sex” and arguing that structural reform to eliminate sex inequality at work is needed to eliminate
sexual harassment).
54. See, e.g., Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 600 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding that allegations
may constitute a breach of contract, but not sex discrimination or harassment); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding supervisor’s unwanted sexual conduct
might be actionable under state criminal statutes, or could “give rise to a civil action in tort,” but did
not violate Title VII), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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and perpetuated historic and outdated sex (as well as race and other)
stereotypes and systemic subordination, and worked to advance sex-based
inequality at work—courts came to recognize that anti-discrimination law
aptly captured the nature of the harm.55 Framing the problem as one of
equality and civil and human rights helped shift public perception and
galvanize support.56 Accordingly, as Part III elaborates, a robust body of
case law has developed, defining the circumstances under which sexual
harassment (which includes sexual assault) violates Title VII's prohibition
of sex discrimination.57 Sexual harassment at work may include sexual
assault and other forms of sexualized violence, as well as intimate partner
violence.58 The civil rights remedy enacted as part of the 1994 Violence
Against Women Act59 (VAWA) built on Title VII’s recognition of sexual
harassment as sex discrimination; the VAWA civil rights remedy
similarly reflected the understanding that gender violence violates its
target’s civil rights, and that a civil rights violation inflicts a harm distinct
from that recognized under tort or other common law theories.60 Acts of
gender violence—including sexual harassment at work, intimate partner
violence, and sexual assault—lie on a continuum of related acts that
generally reflect and perpetuate gender stereotypes. Thus, these acts
should give rise to civil rights claims regardless of the context.
Although the compensatory and deterrence goals of tort and antidiscrimination law are closely related, practical and symbolic differences
55. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 53, at 49–58, 162–76 (tracing the evolution of sexual harassment
cases); Franke, supra note 53, at 698–725 (same).
56. See BAKER, supra note 53, at 179–80.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination based on sex). See
infra Part III for a discussion of the contours of liability for sexual assault in employment.
58. See, e.g., Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (upholding sexual harassment claim in case
alleging sexual assault); Nat'l Resource Ctr., Creating Workplaces Free from Domestic Violence,
Sexual Harassment and Violence, and Stalking, WORKPLACES RESPOND TO DOMESTIC & SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, https://www.workplacesrespond.org/ [https://perma.cc/HS5Q-7KP3] (discussing
workplace responses, including legal remedies recognizing sexual violence at work as a form of
sexual harassment).
59. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941–42
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
60. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 740–47 (2007) (discussing sexual harassment law and VAWA civil rights
remedy’s framing of sex harassment and gender violence as a form of discrimination). For a
legislative history of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, including the rationale for framing gender
violence as a violation of civil rights, see, for example, Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women
and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence,
Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1996).
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remain.61 The harm of sexual violence is different from that of other
torts.62 Accordingly, compensation formulas for physical injury typically
used in tort cases, such as workers’ compensation schedules, do not
accurately compensate for the different nature of the harm.63 Framing
sexual harassment as a civil rights violation allows for a more accurate
account of the nature of the offending act(s) and the resulting harm, for
example, by allowing for evidence of epithets, comments, and patterns of
behavior that simply might not be relevant in a tort claim. It allows for
arguments naming the harm in terms of discriminatory practices, which
can lead, for example, to remedies requiring policy change.64 Framing the
harm as a civil rights violation rather than a private tort also supports norm
shifting that challenges underlying biases.65 This framing should not
diminish the availability of tort remedies, which continue to be important,
particularly in an era of increasing hostility toward discrimination
claims.66 At the same time, civil rights laws should not be abandoned, and
should be invoked to redress the civil rights-based harms resulting from
gender violence in a full range of contexts.
Nevertheless, no statutory civil rights remedy analogous to Title VII or
42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to claims of sexual assault by federal officials.67
61. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Reexamining Bivens After Ziglar v. Abbasi, 9 CONLAWNOW 77,
83 (2018) (recognizing that “[c]onstitutional torts differ significantly from their non-constitutional,
unintentional tort cousins in ways that might suggest a broader role for damages actions”). But see,
e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons
for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55 (2006) (detailing advantages of tort
law as tool for recovery for sexual assault).
62. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 53.
63. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND TORT LAW (Robin West &
Cynthia Bowman, eds. 2018) (discussing ways that tort law fails to provide full compensation for
injuries that disproportionately affect women); Sisk, supra note 42, at 785 (noting that “rape, sexual
contact, and sexual assault are hardly accidental and are not adequately compensated by the schedule
of payments for ordinary physical injuries”).
64. For example, remedies might include policies prohibiting and training concerning gender
violence, including gender violence prevention. In some cases, survivors may be as or more interested
in policy change that will help prevent others from being harmed, than in monetary damages.
65. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 60, at 756–67.
66. See generally Bublick, supra note 61; Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious
Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2014); Marcia L. McCormick, Let’s
Pretend that Federal Courts Aren’t Hostile to Discrimination Claims, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 22 (2015);
Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 (2014). For further
discussion of tort law’s treatment of sexual harassment and assault, see, for example, CHAMALLAS,
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 63.
67. See Sisk, supra note 42, at 760–61 (discussing absence of statutory remedy for constitutional
violations by federal actors). The discussion in this Article addresses sexual assaults committed
outside of employment and criminal detention contexts, each of which impose their own statutory
liability schemes. See Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012) (providing

08 - Goldscheid (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1/16/2020 3:51 PM

2019] SEXUAL ASSAULT, FEDERAL ACTORS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1655
Consequently, survivors of sexual assault by federal officials seeking civil
rights redress would turn to the so-called “Bivens” doctrine that applies in the
absence of statutory recourse.68 But the possibility of recovery is starkly
limited. As the following discussion of the Bivens doctrine reveals, the law
has evolved to leave a survivor with no recourse directly against the
government for violations of the survivor’s constitutional rights, and with an
uncertain remedy against individual federal officials who either committed or
facilitated the assault. This contrasts sharply with the scope of liability, and
prevailing norms for prevention, for sexual assault and harassment in
employment.69 The comparison illustrates the need for reform.
B.

No Bivens Claims Against the Federal Government Itself

Civil rights recourse against federal actors for sexual assaults derives
from the Supreme Court 1971 decision, Bivens, which recognized a
damages remedy for constitutional violations by individual federal
employees.70 The doctrine has been the source of controversy and has
been narrowed in recent years to the point where it is said to be virtually
unavailable outside cases that precisely track previously recognized
contexts.71 Bivens’ uncertain application to cases of sexual assaults by
federal agents illustrates its harsh limitations.
exclusive remedy for sexual assault by federal employees). Civil rights claims based on sexual
assaults in prisons generally would have to comply with the Prison Reform Litigation Act (PRLA),
42 U.S.C. § 1997e. See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (affirming PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement applied to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65,
68–69 (3d Cir. 2000) (barring a Bivens claim under PRLA by failure to exhaust administrative
remedies). However, the PLRA does not apply to claims by a plaintiff held in immigration detention.
See Agyeman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 296 F.3d 871, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002);
LaFontant v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
68. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
69. See infra Part III for discussion of the current doctrine and proposed reforms for accountability
for sexual assault and harassment at work.
70. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
71. For commentary critiquing the increasingly limited interpretation of the Bivens doctrine, see,
for example, Bell supra note 61; Jules Lobel, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise of Accountability, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2149 (2018); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right
to Redress, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167 (2018); Steve Vladeck, On Justice Kennedy’s Flawed and
Depressing Narrowing of Constitutional Damages Remedies, JUST SECURITY (June 19, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42334/justice-kennedys-flawed-depressing-narrowing-constitutionaldamages-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/RX93-AHBJ] (arguing that Abbasi erroneously concluded that
the federal courts are powerless to provide a damages remedy in the absence of express congressional
authorization even if the government systematically abused and discriminated against post 9/11
detainees). Indeed, the scope of Bivens remedies had been widely critiqued even before the Abbasi
Court’s further narrowing of relief. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009) (arguing that instead
of the case-by-case approach of current law, federal courts should presume that a well-pleaded
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In Bivens, the Court implied a cause of action for damages against
federal agents who allegedly violated the Constitution.72 The suit was
based on Webster Bivens’s claims that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics illegally entered his apartment, arrested him for alleged
narcotics violations without a warrant, and used unreasonable force, and
that the arrest was made without probable cause.73 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, emphasized the capacity for harm associated with
the abuse of federal power.74 The decision invoked Marbury v.
Madison’s75 reminder that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”76 It reasoned that “no special factors”
counseled hesitation in the absence of Congressional action.77 The Court
distinguished this case from others such as those involving “federal fiscal
policy” or cases in which Congress has provided an alternative, and
substitute remedy.78 The decision concluded that Bivens was entitled to
recover money damages for injuries suffered as a result of the agents’
Fourth Amendment violations.79
Nevertheless, Bivens has been subject to criticism, and the scope of the
doctrine has been narrowed in subsequent years. One dominant strand of
critique questions the Court’s authority to fashion a federal common law
right of action for constitutional violations.80 Under that view, expressed
in Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black’s Bivens dissent, Congress, not
the Court, should create new causes of action.81 This separation-of-powers
concern has led subsequent decisions to delineate limited avenues for relief.
With respect to institutional accountability, the Court has interpreted
complaint alleging a constitutional violation gives rise to a damages action under Bivens); Alexander
A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual
Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (reviewing Bivens decisions and calls for abandoning
individual liability model and arguing instead for hybrid model that would allow for governmental
liability where individuals acted pursuant to a formal or informal official policy); Carlos M. Vazquez
& Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 509 (2013) (critiquing interpretation of Bivens in setting a “remarkably low” standard for
declining to recognize a Bivens action).
72. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97.
73. Id. at 389.
74. Id. at 391.
75. 5 U.S. 163 (1803).
76. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163).
77. Id. at 396.
78. Id. at 396–97.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 71, at 117–18 (discussing critiques).
81. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the doctrine to flatly preclude any direct liability by the federal agency
itself for constitutional wrongs committed by its employees. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer82 (FDIC) decision rejected the United
States’ liability in a case alleging that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) fired John Meyer in violation of his due process
rights.83 The decision held that the logic of Bivens was to deter
constitutional wrongs by individual federal agents, not to imply a cause
of action against the agency.84 It refused to extend Bivens to authorize a
cause of action directly against a federal agency.85 The Court emphasized
that the purpose of Bivens was to deter the officer’s misconduct.86 It
reasoned that implying a damages action directly against a federal agency
would allow claimants to bypass qualified immunity questions, and
therefore would eviscerate the need to sue the individual wrongdoer.87
According to the Court, if institutions (such as the federal government)
were to be held to account under Bivens, “the deterrent effects of the
Bivens remedy would be lost.”88 Moreover, the decision concluded that
“special factors counselling hesitation” weighed against implying a cause
of action because recognizing a direct action would create “a potentially
enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.”89 The Court
rejected arguments that the federal government expends significant
resources indemnifying employees who are held to account under Bivens,
reasoning that “decisions involving ‘federal fiscal policy’ are not ours to
make,” but rather, should be left to Congress.90 Accordingly, any civil
rights-based liability resulting from sexual harassment or assault by
federal agents would be based on the unconstitutional acts of federal
officials; a survivor would not be able to hold the federal government
directly to account.
82. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 484–85. The Court reasoned that the Bivens Court authorized a cause of action based on
the agents’ individual actions because a direct action against the Government was not available. Id.
In Bivens, no direct action was available because sovereign immunity applied and no waiver
authorized suit. See id. at 485 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90, 410).
85. Id. at 485.
86. Id.
87. Id.; Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (confirming that “[t]he purpose of
Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations”).
88. FDIC, 510 U.S. at 485.
89. Id. at 486 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
90. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396) (discussing how the federal government has the discretion
to indemnify employees accused of wrongdoing); see 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1) (2019). For further
discussion of the role of indemnification, see infra notes 245–246, and accompanying text.
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Limited Scope of Bivens Claims Against Federal Employees

Although Bivens established a private right of action against the federal
government for a federal employee’s constitutional violations, the scope
of the Bivens doctrine has been narrowed significantly, creating
challenges for its meaningful use as an accountability tool. Following the
Bivens decision, which upheld a claim for a federal employee’s Fourth
Amendment violations (unlawful search and seizure), the Court has
upheld Bivens causes of action in two additional contexts: gender
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment91 and Eighth
Amendment violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
based on federal jailers’ failure to treat a prisoner’s asthma.92 Over the
ensuing decades, however, the Court began to limit acceptable claims.93
In the 2017 decision Ziglar v. Abbasi,94 the U.S. Supreme Court
declared (through a four-justice majority of six participating justices) that
“expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” and
indicated that the Court will rarely, if ever, recognize a Bivens remedy in
a new context.95 The claims in that case were brought by six men of Arab
or South Asian descent who were arrested during investigations
conducted after the September 11 attacks; the men were detained and then
removed from the United States.96 Their Bivens claims alleged that their
pretrial detention violated the substantive due process component of the
Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.97 The Court reviewed
the history of Bivens claims and traced its growing concerns associated
with implying a private right of action for constitutional violations. In
addition to separation of powers concerns, these included the “substantial”
costs of defense and indemnification and the time and administrative costs
associated with discovery and trial.98 The Court described the shift in its
general approach to recognizing implied damages remedies and suggested
that the three cases in which it had recognized an implied cause of action

91. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (recognizing implied cause of action for gender
discrimination when Congressman fired female administrative assistant).
92. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The reasoning in Carlson has been extended to Fifth
Amendment substantive due process violations as well. See infra section II.D.1.
93. For discussion of this trend, see supra note 71.
94. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
95. Id. at 1857.
96. Id. at 1853.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1856.

08 - Goldscheid (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1/16/2020 3:51 PM

2019] SEXUAL ASSAULT, FEDERAL ACTORS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1659
“might have been different if they were decided today.”99 Nevertheless, it
confirmed the “continued force, or even the necessity,” of a Bivens cause
of action in cases of unconstitutional searches and seizures, given the
settled nature of the law and the “undoubted reliance” on it.100 It also noted
that one factor counseling in favor of recognizing a cause of action would
be if, like the claims in Bivens and Davis, the plaintiffs faced either
“damages or nothing.”101 That reasoning is consistent with the Court’s
prior recognition that Bivens actions advance deterrence by holding
individual officers accountable for their unlawful actions.102
The Court in Abbasi emphasized its reluctance to extend Bivens to new
categories of defendants.103 It made clear that, ordinarily, Congress, and
not the courts, should decide whether a damages remedy is available.104
Consequently, the first inquiry in any new case would be whether the suit
presents a “new” Bivens context.105 If the case presents a new Bivens
context, then a court would not uphold a claim if there were “special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.”106 That inquiry would turn on “whether the Judiciary is well
suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh
the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”107 The
inquiry would assess the potential remedy’s “impact on governmental
operations systemwide,” including “the burdens on Government
employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and
consequences to the Government itself when [] tort and monetary liability
mechanisms . . . are used to bring about the proper formulation and
implementation of public policies.”108 Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that a damages remedy might be necessary if equitable remedies prove
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1856–57.
101. Id. at 1862.
102. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
103. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1859. The Court articulated a number of factors to determine whether the case is different
in a “meaningful” way from previous Bivens cases, and counseled considering, for example, “the rank
of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official
action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or
emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was
operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or
the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider. Id. at 1859–60.
106. Id. at 1857 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
107. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58.
108. Id. at 1858.
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insufficient to redress past harm and deter future violations.109 It also
distinguished the circumstances raised in Abbasi, where governmental
policies were subject to challenge, from cases such as Bivens or Davis110
that involved individual instances of discrimination or law enforcement
overreach, which the Court acknowledged, “due to their very nature are
difficult to address except by way of damages actions after the fact.”111
Subsequent lower court decisions have parsed carefully the differences
between the claim before the court and those previously recognized, often
rejecting Bivens claims in light of the Court’s current approach.112

109. See id.
110. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
111. Id. at 1862.
112. Notably, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 822–23
(5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (rejecting Bivens claim based on cross-border shooting because it created a
“new context” for which federal courts lack authority to imply a Bivens remedy and because special
factors counseled against implying private right of action), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2636
(2019); cf., e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept.
7, 2018) (No. 18-309) (upholding Bivens claim that shooting by U.S. Border Patrol Agent in Mexico
violated Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights). For equal protection claims, see, for example, Atterbury
v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 805 F.3d 398, 403, 409 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting Fifth Amendment claim by
terminated employee of federal contractor against federal agency because claim presented “new”
Bivens context); Patrick v Adjusters Int’l., No. 16-CV-2789 (WFK) (PK), 2017 WL 6521251
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017) (rejecting discrimination claim by employee of state contractor that was
using federal office space; “new” context and “special factors” weigh against allowing Bivens claim).
For Eighth Amendment claims, compare Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91–96 (3d Cir. 2018)
(upholding Bivens claim for Eighth Amendment violation based on alleged failure to protect plaintiff
from substantial risk of serious injury at the hands of other inmates, but rejecting Bivens claims based
on Fifth Amendment punitive detention claim and First Amendment retaliation claims, which were
deemed novel and special factors counseled against extension), with Belt v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
336 F. Supp. 3d 428, 438–39 (D.N.J. 2018) (permitting Bivens claim for Eighth Amendment violation
based on sexual assault by prison counselor to proceed), and Gonzalez v. Hasty, 269 F. Supp. 3d 45,
63–64 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (refusing to recognize Eighth Amendment claim challenging plaintiff’s
treatment in prison because facts were significantly different than Carlson and plaintiff failed to
establish that conditions rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation); see also, e.g., Lanuza
v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1034 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding Bivens claim based on allegations that
government immigration attorney’s falsification of evidence violated Fifth Amendment rights). But
see, e.g., Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (refusing to recognize Bivens
claim for First Amendment retaliation claim based on TSA screener’s false report to local police);
Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 525, 528 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting Bivens claims by nine Latino
men, alleging that ICE agents’ stops; invasions of homes without a warrant, consent, or probable
cause, and illegal seizures violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment). See generally AMERICAN
IMMIG. COUNCIL, BIVENS BASICS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS 2 n.2
(2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/bivens-an-introductory-guide [https://perma.cc/2SGC-7T4F]
(citing post-Abbasi cases in which the Court has refused to recognize a Bivens claim).
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D.

Bivens Claims Against Federal Officials for Sexual Assault

Absent the Court’s skeptical approach, one would expect courts to
easily recognize Bivens claims based on federal officers’ sexual assaults;
indeed, those claims should be available even under that skeptical
standard. The Abbasi Court reaffirmed the ongoing viability of Bivens
claims against law enforcement misconduct.113 Bivens actions based on
sexual assault should be deemed to fall within the purview of alreadyrecognized Bivens claims, and thus should not be subject to Abbasi’s
presumption against upholding a remedy. As discussed more fully below,
sexual assault violates substantive due process, Fourth Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, and equal protection rights, all of which have been
recognized as the bases for Bivens causes of action.114
Even if sexual assault is deemed to be a “new” Bivens context, Bivens
claims based on federal officers’ sexual assaults should be recognized
notwithstanding the Court’s skeptical approach. For example, Bivens
claims based on sexual assaults committed by federal agents do not
present “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress.”115 Sexual assault by federal officers do
not implicate policy concerns; there is no arguably defensible policy
authorizing sexual assault by federal officers.116 These are not claims for
113. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856–57. The Abbasi Court specifically referenced the “continued force,
or even the necessity” of Bivens claims in cases of unlawful searches and seizures by law enforcement.
Id. at 1856. Sexual assault by federal officers constitutes an even more grievous violation of the right
“to be secure in their persons” than an unlawful search or seizure of property without a warrant. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
114. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (recognizing a violation of Eighth
Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979) (recognizing a violation of Fifth
Amendment equal protection); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)
(recognizing a violation of Fourth Amendment due process for unlawful search); see also infra
sections II.D.2, 3, 4.
115. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. See also supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the Court’s analysis of “special factors counselling hesitation.”
116. Thus, the reasoning employed by the Court in Abbasi, where the Plaintiffs’ challenges to
detention policies were found to implicate important governmental policymaking decisions, could not
apply here. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–63. Although some cases alleging unlawful searches at
border crossings might implicate immigration policies concerning transport of unlawful substances,
and may raise factual questions whether a particular search was or was not unconstitutional, there can
be no question that unreasonable searches involving sexual assaults are not justified by policy
concerns. See, e.g., Van Beek v. Robinson, 879 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714–15 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(determining that intrusive search of woman crossing the border violated Fourth Amendment due
process rights and denying qualified immunity and concluding that right to be free from intrusive
search was clearly established); Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1026–28, 1033–34 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (recognizing that forcible touching during pat-down searches and strip searches of AfricanAmerican women while going through customs at O’Hare International Airport may violate the
Fourth Amendment, but dismissing claims against individual agents based on qualified immunity).
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which Congress has provided an alternative remedy intended to substitute
for a constitutional claim.117 Moreover, authorizing claims for federal
officers’ sexual assaults would not unreasonably or disruptively intrude
on the functioning of the executive branch. Although all litigation imposes
some costs and disruptions, whether against the government or an
individual, the countervailing policy interest in deterring sexual assault
should justify providing an avenue for relief. It would be ironic if the
prevalence of sexual assault would counsel against liability; instead, the
response should be to take meaningful action to prevent it, rather than
eliminating the possibility of redress. Moreover, these cases are suited for
judicial relief since courts are accustomed to adjudicating claims of sexual
assault as civil rights violations.
In addition, cases of sexual assault by federal actors present the very
type of circumstances the Abbasi Court identified as suitable for damages
relief, since equitable remedies may be insufficient to redress the harm
inflicted by sexual assault.118 Sexual assault often results in economic
damages, whether from medical costs, mental health consequences, or—
for those in the formal economy—lost wages, and even housing, which
would not otherwise be compensable.119 Monetary damages additionally

Other sexual assaults committed by federal agents, such as assaults by border agents of those
presenting themselves to seek asylum, lack any conceivable policy-based justification. See also infra
section IV.C.2.
117. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858, 1862–63. Although statutory schemes may provide redress for
sexual assault committed by federal actors in some institutional settings, such as prisons, see PLRA,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012), or federally funded educational programs, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
(2012) (Title IX), no statutory remedy is available for survivors of sexual assault by federal actors
outside of those contexts. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Doe H. v. Haskell Indian
Nations Univ., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1286 (D. Kan. 2017) (rejecting equal protection-based Bivens
claim based on sexual assault by male students in federally-owned university because alternative
remedy exists through executive order prohibiting discrimination and providing procedural due
process rights). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the FTCA, which might provide a
tort remedy, is no substitute for a claim for constitutional violations. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 477–78 (1994) (holding that a constitutional tort claim is not “cognizable” under the FTCA, and
therefore, the constitutional tort suit properly was brought against the federal agency itself).
118. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (recognizing the importance of a damages remedy where
equitable remedies are insufficient).
119. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 73–78 (2008) (reviewing studies documenting
the economic impact of sexual assault and intimate partner violence); The Facts on Gender-Based
Workplace Violence, WORKPLACES RESPOND DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A NAT’L RESOURCE
CTR., https://www.workplacesrespond.org/resource-library/facts-gender-based-workplace-violence/
[https://perma.cc/NZA6-MWSX] (same); Sheetal Dhir, It’s time to speak about the economic cost of
sexual assault, AL JAZEERA, (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/timespeak-economic-cost-sexual-assault-180930071453246.html [https://perma.cc/9A4E-KV63]
(discussing studies and the economic impact of sexual assault).
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may advance the primary purpose of Bivens, deterring unconstitutional
conduct by federal officers, by sending a message to officials that sexual
assault by federal officials is impermissible.120
Moreover, these claims present the case of “damages or nothing,”
which the Court has recognized warrants relief.121 Survivors who are
harmed outside of employment or detention settings often have no other
means of statutory redress, whether for damages or injunctive relief.
Bivens claims based on sexual assault, like the claims in Bivens and Davis,
are typically claims seeking redress for individual constitutional
violations, not challenges to institutional policy.122 Although tort claims
may be available under the FTCA in limited cases, tort remedies for
survivors of sexual violence by federal officials are riddled with
exceptions that frequently preclude relief.123 Tort-based relief does not
provide the same redress as civil rights claims for constitutional harms.124
Nevertheless, Bivens actions seeking to hold federal officials to account
for sexual assault have met with mixed results, leading to uncertainty
about whether or when a plaintiff’s claims might be sustained under the
Court’s skeptical approach. The following discussion reviews how the
doctrine has been applied to Fifth Amendment substantive Due Process
claims, Fourth Amendment unlawful searches, Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment, and Fifth Amendment equal protection claims.
It summarizes how courts have evaluated both claims against the official
who committed the assault, and against officials whose negligence or
deliberate indifference may have served to facilitate it.

120. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Onawa, 323 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing, in case alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 based on stalking and sexual assault by police officer, that
liability would put police departments and cities “on notice” after mayor did nothing after hearing
complaints of sexual harassment and stalking by police officer).
121. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862.
122. See supra note 111.
123. See notes 42–50 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Peteet v. Hawkins, No. H-17-1312, 2018
WL 4033775, at *5, *6 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2018) (dismissing FTCA case based on allegations of
sexual abuse and assault by federal prison guard, based on the conclusion that the assault was
committed outside the scope of the guard’s employment and dismissing negligence claims,
concluding that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative complaint).
124. See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. Congress itself has recognized the distinction
in the Westfall Act, which Congress enacted in 1988 to specify that the FTCA is the exclusive remedy
for tort claims against federal employees, and which expressly preserves the ability to bring suits for
constitutional violations under Bivens. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012); James E. Pfander &
David Baltmanis, W(h)ither Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 231, 232 (2012) (arguing that the
Westfall Act preserves Bivens actions); Sisk, supra note 42, at 770–71 (same).
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Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process

It is well established that sexual assault violates bodily integrity and
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.125 Decisions
addressing Fifth Amendment substantive due process-based Bivens
claims on behalf of immigration detainees rely on Eighth Amendment
doctrine in considering claims against federal officials who allegedly
acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the risk of sexual
violence.126 For example, in Doe v. Neveleff,127 a Texas district court
considered immigrant detainees’ claims that they were sexually assaulted
by Donald Dunn, a federal officer, while escorting them to airports or bus
stations after they were released from detention following the
determination that their asylum claims were sufficiently meritorious to be
heard before an immigration court.128 The women sued ICE officials that
they claimed were “deliberately indifferent” to the risk of sexual assault
by Dunn.129 The court recognized their claims, reasoning that they “d[id]
not differ” from the claims in Carlson, in which the Supreme Court upheld
a Bivens actions based on Eighth Amendment violation claims.130 The
court rejected some defendants’ motions seeking qualified immunity,

125. See, e.g., E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that allegations of sexual
assault by detention official “could not have served a legitimate governmental objective and . . . set
forth a plausible violation of her right to personal bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 239 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that
sexual assault by city and auxiliary police officer violated substantive due process right to bodily
integrity); Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that rape, as opposed
to “nominal or trivial[] battery,” committed under color of state law, is a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment); Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d
1057, 1062–64 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexual assault of teacher by top school district officials
may violate substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
ICE,
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
MISCONDUCT,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcementmisconduct#sex [https://perma.cc/R4KT-JYMA] (stating that law enforcement officers who engage
in nonconsensual sexual contact with persons in their custody deprive those persons of liberty without
due process of law, which includes the right to bodily integrity).
126. For Bivens claims alleging Eighth Amendment violations, see infra section III.D.3.
Notwithstanding courts’ analogies in immigration detention cases to the Eighth Amendment, a
number of circuits have concluded that the legal rights of an immigration detainee are analogous to
those of a pretrial detainee. See, e.g., Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 306–07 (joining and citing similar decisions
from other circuits).
127. Doe v. Neveleff, No. A–11–CV–907–LY, 2013 WL 489442 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2013).
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *6. The reported decision does not address the claims against Dunn, who was arrested
and criminally charged. Id. at *11. In a number of other decisions, claims brought against officers
who committed the assaults arose from illegal searches and, consequently, were analyzed as violations
of the Fourth Amendment. See infra section II.D.2.
130. Neveleff, 2013 WL 489442, at *6.
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reasoning that their knowing failure to ensure that policies against sexual
assault were being followed could amount to “subjective deliberate
indifference” that would defeat their qualified immunity claim.131
In other cases, courts have recognized that federal officials’ responses
to physical, emotional and sexual abuse by other federal officials would
violate due process rights, but have granted officials’ claims for qualified
immunity. For example, in Doe v. Robertson,132 a number of female
immigrants claimed that they had been sexually assaulted by a federal
official while being transported from an immigration detention center.133
The official who assaulted them pled guilty to federal and state criminal
charges.134 The women brought suit against other officials, alleging that
they had been deliberately indifferent to violations of the women’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights to “basic human needs.”135 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that Bivens would be
an appropriate vehicle for plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims.136 It
concluded that plaintiffs had alleged officials’ actual knowledge of
violations of the agreement binding the facility that required that
transported detainees be escorted by at least one officer of the same
gender, the purpose of which was to prevent sexual assault, and that they
knew of the purpose of the provision.137 Both of those conclusions
supported the plaintiffs’ argument that the officials acted with “deliberate
indifference.”138 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the claims on qualified
immunity grounds, determining that “no clearly established law” provides
that an official’s knowledge of contractual breaches of provisions aimed
to prevent sexual assault, standing alone, amount to deliberate
indifference in violation of a detainee’s Fifth Amendment rights.139 Thus,
131. Id. at *8 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases rejecting qualified immunity claims in claims of
sexual assault). Notably, the court granted qualified immunity to one defendant who was off site, and
therefore did not directly control the time, place, and transport of individual residents. Id. at *9; see
also Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 306–09 (inter alia, denying summary judgment motion by county
defendants on failure to protect and failure to train claims against officials based on their deliberate
indifference to federal official’s sexual abuse of detainee, and denying qualified immunity to
defendants, holding that plaintiff alleged violation of clearly established constitutional rights); infra
notes 132–142 and accompanying text (discussing the role of qualified immunity in cases involving
sexual assault by federal and state officials).
132. 751 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).
133. Id. at 385.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 387.
136. Id. at 387 n.2.
137. Id. at 389.
138. Id. at 392.
139. Id. at 392–93.

08 - Goldscheid (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1666

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/16/2020 3:51 PM

[Vol. 94:1639

by blurring the substantive analysis with the qualified immunity inquiry,
the court denied the claim.140 Other courts similarly have precluded
recovery in Bivens substantive due process claims, either because they
found the allegations factually insufficient, or because they granted
qualified immunity to officials.141 In cases brought against state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, qualified immunity similarly has shielded many,
though not all, from liability.142
2.

Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search

Courts also have drawn on the Bivens decision itself, which was based
on allegations of an unlawful search and seizure,143 to hold that claims for
sexual assaults by law enforcement officials constitute unreasonable
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For example, a CBP
officer’s search of a woman crossing the Canadian border, in which he
twisted her nipples and touched her breasts, and conducted a “forceful
sweep” of her groin area, violated her Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.144 The court upheld the claims and
140. Id. at 394. For critiques of qualified immunity doctrine, see, e.g., supra note 46.
141. See, e.g., E.A.F.F. v. Gonzales, 600 F. App’x 205, 214 (5th Cir. 2015) (determining federal
officials were entitled to qualified immunity after concluding that they lacked subjective awareness
of the risk of substantial harm or that the defendants failed to respond reasonably in case alleging that
eleven unaccompanied Central American minors were physically and sexually abused in federal
custody); Shorter v. United States, No. 17–8911 (RMB), 2018 WL 1734061, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Apr. 9,
2018) (holding Fifth Amendment Bivens claim of transgender prisoner who alleged that officials
failed to adequately investigate sexual assault in abeyance; noting that case would constitute a “new”
Bivens context, but granting leave to amend to supplement pleadings).
142. See, e.g., Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 336–39 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding prison officials
deliberately indifferent and denying motion for qualified immunity when they failed to modify
training and policies after a sexual assault occurred in their facility). But see, e.g., Rivera v. Bonner,
691 F. App’x 234, 240 (5th Cir. 2017) (determining that county sheriff and jail administrator were
entitled to qualified immunity on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim that they were
deliberately indifferent to safety risks after guard sexually assaulted detainee; available information
was “vague and inconclusive,” and deliberate indifference in hiring was precluded; and, no clearly
established law indicated that limited response to previous sexual assault incidents violates the
Constitution); Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309 318, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that
Williamson County was not deliberately indifferent to policy violations that increased the risk of
sexual assault of detainees, given deputy’s “swift action” after learning of sexual assaults by
employee); Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11–02390–PHX–NVW, 2012 WL
2873835, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012) (dismissing Due Process 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against ICE
employees following sexual assault of transgender pretrial detainee by officer and other detainees
given lack of legal authority establishing constitutional right to be housed in sex-specific immigration
detention facility). For additional cases analyzing Section 1983 claims brought under other theories
of liability, see infra notes 149, 163, 164, 167.
143. See supra notes 70–79.
144. Van Beek v. Robinson, 879 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709–11, 712–14 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (denying
summary judgment against the officer who conducted the “search” and another officer who
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rejected arguments that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity.145 Similarly, allegations that a corrections officer searched up
and down a prisoner’s legs, whispered in his ear, “[y]ou don’t feel like a
Mexican,” grabbed his genitals and subjected him to nearly daily verbal
sexual comments and pat-down searches, were sufficient to state a claim
that the officer violated the prisoner’s Fourth Amendment rights.146 In
another case, U.S. Customs Service officials at Chicago’s O’Hare
International Airport who conducted intrusive strip searches were found
to have violated the Fourth Amendment; however, some of the officers
involved in the search were granted qualified immunity.147 Notably, the
court in that case additionally upheld claims against supervisory officials
for their alleged knowledge and approval of the unlawful searches.148 In
analogous cases against state officials, at least one court upheld a Fourth
Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful seizure against a state
prison guard who used force to keep the plaintiff in the room where she
was sexually assaulted by another guard.149 Nevertheless, other courts
have rejected similar claims, determining, for example, that sexual assault
of a pretrial detainee was “meaningfully different” from prior Bivens
cases, and that special factors counseled hesitation, given Congress’s
legislation addressing prison conditions.150

participated in her detention and was present during the “search”).
145. See, e.g., id. at 714–15 (concluding that a reasonable CBP officer would be on notice that
twisting nipples, fondling breasts, and forcefully sweeping genital areas violated Fourth
Amendment rights).
146. Kirkelie v. Thissell, No.: 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL 5900075, at *2, *5 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 30, 2017), adopted by No. 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2018 WL 306666, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2018); see also, e.g., McCarroll v. Matteau, No. 9:09–CV–355 (NAM/TWD), 2012 WL
4378121, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), adopting report issued in McCarroll v. Matteau, No. 9:09–
CV–0355 (NAM/TWD), 2012 WL 4380156, at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (upholding Fourth
Amendment claims of prisoner arising from unwanted sexual touching and rejecting arguments that
the incidents were justified by any legitimate penological interest such as searching for prohibited
contraband).
147. See Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1026–28, 1031–34 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying
qualified immunity for some defendants since a customs service employee could not have reasonably
believed that reasonable suspicion existed to support a strip search absent any facts triggering
suspicion, but granting qualified immunity for other defendants, holding that it was not clearly
established that pat down searches could not be conducted based on no suspicion).
148. Id. at 1029. Notably, the court also upheld claims against witnesses to the searches for their
participation, observation, and failure to intervene. Id. at 1029–30.
149. Ramos v. Swatzell, No. CV 12–01089 BRO (SPx), 2015 WL 13157319, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2015).
150. See, e.g., Morgan v. Shivers, No. 1:14-cv-7921-GHW, 2018 WL 618451, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 29, 2018).
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Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Similarly, courts have upheld Bivens claims based on sexual assault by
officials in conditions of confinement, recognizing that it is “well
established” that sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate can constitute
“serious harm” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.151 Immigration
detainees are civil detainees, so their constitutional protections are based
on the Fifth, not the Eighth Amendment.152 Since the Fifth Amendment is
more protective than the Eighth, cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment
provide a floor for minimal protection for immigrant detainees.153
In Carlson v. Green,154 the Court upheld a Bivens claim based on
allegations that a prisoner died because prison officials failed to give him
proper medical attention.155 The landmark Farmer v. Brennan156 decision
built on that ruling, and upheld a Bivens claim against prison officials for
disregarding the risk of serious harm in a case brought by a prisoner
diagnosed by prison authorities as a transsexual, who was beaten and
raped by another inmate.157 The Court there squarely held that sexual
abuse of a prisoner has no legitimate penological purpose.158 Subsequent
Eighth Amendment claims have succeeded against officials who
committed the assaults as well as against officials who disregarded the
risk of harm. For example, in Leibelson v. Collins,159 a federal district
court upheld an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim brought by a
transgender incarcerated woman who claimed that a guard sexually
assaulted her when the guard inappropriately touched the prisoner’s
rectum in the course of a strip search.160 The court reasoned that, even
151. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830–31 (1994) (ruling on a Bivens claim).
152. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he more protective
fourteenth amendment standard applies to conditions of confinement when detainees . . . have not
been convicted’ of a crime.” (quoting Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987));
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, No. CV-15-00250-TUC-DCB, 2016 WL 8188563, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov.
18, 2016) (immigrant detainees “are protected by both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments”).
153. See, e.g., Jones, 393 F.3d at 931.
154. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
155. Id. at 23.
156. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
157. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830. The Court held that a prison official may be held liable under
the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement if the official “knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Id. at 847.
158. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833–34.
159. No. 5:15-cv-12863, 2017 WL 6614102 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 27, 2017).
160. Id. at *13–14 (upholding claim against officer who allegedly “inserted his finger(s) into [the
plaintiff’s] rectum” during a strip search and denying qualified immunity), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
Leibelson v. Cook, 761 F. App’x 196, 198 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019), at *3–4 (upholding denial of
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though it viewed the case as presenting a new Bivens context under
Abbasi, the claims were analogous to those in Carlson, and no special
factors counseled hesitation since the case did “not implicate national
security, prison policy, or other executive or legislative functions.”161
Other decisions similarly have upheld Eighth Amendment-based Bivens
claims in sexual assault cases.162 In analogous cases alleging Eighth
Amendment violations against state officials, courts similarly have
squarely recognized that “sexual harassment of prisoners by guards” is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.163 Courts have responded to officials’
defenses arguing that sexual relations between guards and prisoners were
consensual by acknowledging the inherently coercive nature of sexual
relations in prisons.164 At the same time, and unsurprisingly, some courts
qualified immunity for officer alleged to have committed sexual assault, but rejecting Eighth
Amendment claim based on denial of food because plaintiff had abandoned the claim); see also infra
note 180 (discussing the Leibelson decision’s rejection of Equal Protection arguments against
other defendants).
161. Leibelson, 2017 WL 6614102, at *12.
162. See, e.g., Millbrook v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 617 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (upholding
Eighth Amendment Bivens claim based on allegations of sexual assault by defendant officer Edinger);
Barnes v. Broyles, No. CV 13-737 (NLH), 2016 WL 155037, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2016) (upholding
Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against prison guard based on allegation that he sexually assaulted
and/or fondled him); Kirkelie v. Thissell, No.: 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL 5900075,
at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017), adopted by No. 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2018 WL 306666,
at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018) (upholding Eighth Amendment Bivens claim against officer who
repeatedly sexually assaulted a prisoner); Roberson v. Shaw, No. 3:12–cv–00501–PK, 2013 WL
1295417, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 2013) (upholding Eighth Amendment Bivens claim based on sexual
assault of prisoner by prison official, and recognizing that “sexual assault on an inmate by a prison
official offends human dignity, and is in of itself, sufficient injury to state [an Eighth Amendment
claim]”); infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Amendment claims against
supervisory officials).
163. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., Ball v. Bailey,
No. 7:15cv00003, 2015 WL 4591410, at *8 (W.D. Va. July 29, 2015) (upholding Eighth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on alleged sexual assault by prison guard and collecting cases involving
sexual abuse/assault claims in prisons).
164. See, e.g., E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing that there might
be a factual dispute about whether sexual relations between guard and immigrant detainee was
consensual, but identifying violation of clearly established constitutional right considering ICE
policies and Pennsylvania law deeming any sexual contact between guards and detainees to be sexual
abuse); Rafferty v. Trumball Cty., 915 F.3d 1087, 1096 (6th Cir. 2019) (recognizing rebuttable
presumption that sexual relations between prison guards and prisoners are not consensual); Wood v.
Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047–51 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim based on allegations of sexual harassment by prison guard and creating rebuttable presumption
of non-consent after reviewing courts’ approaches to allegedly consensual sexual relations between
prisoners and guards); Cash v. Cty. of Erie, No. 04–CV–0182–JTC (JJM), 2009 WL 3199558, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (holding that prisoners lack ability to consent to sexual relations with
prison guard); Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (D.Del.1999) (relying on Delaware’s
statutory prohibition of sexual contact between prisoner and guard to reject consent as a defense). But
see, e.g., Graham v. Logan Cty, 741 F.3d 1118, 1126 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “power
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have rejected claims, reasoning that particular allegations of unwanted
physical and sexual advances failed to rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.165
Many courts have found Eighth Amendment violations in cases against
officials who ignored or dismissed the risk of sexual assault either by
prison personnel or by other prisoners.166 Analogous claims have
prevailed against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.167 Not
dynamics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern consent from coercion” but finding
overwhelming evidence of consent in instant case). For a state statute deeming any sexual contact
between a guard and a prisoner non-consensual due to the inherent power differential between guards
and prisoners, see N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3)(e)–(f) (2019). For further discussion of the role of
consent in allegations of sexual assault against prison guards see infra notes 181–183 and
accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Heard v. United States, 2017 WL 5505866, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 2017) (holding
that one physical sexual advance and two verbal sexual advances were insufficient); Obiegbu v.
Werlinger, 581 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a single pat down frisk in which a
correctional officer grabbed prisoner’s genitals through his clothing two times did not violate the
Eighth Amendment); Washington v. Harris, 186 F. App’x 865, 865–66 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(holding that allegations that officer crept up behind prisoner, grabbed genitals, kissed him on the
mouth, and threatened to perform oral sex were deemed de minimus injuries found insufficient to
state Eighth Amendment violation); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a female prison guard’s solicitation of a male prisoner’s manual masturbation, even under the
threat of reprisal, is not more than de minimus injury); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861–62
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a small number of incidents of harassment and alleged touching were
insufficient to allege constitutional violation).
166. See, e.g., Belt v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 336 F. Supp. 3d 428, 440 (D.N.J. 2018)
(acknowledging that the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Bivens claims might constitute “new Bivens
contexts,” but sustaining claim at preliminary stage against officials who failed to intervene or
investigate complaints); Kirkelie v. Thissell, No.: 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL
5900075, at *2, *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017), adopted by No. 1:15-cv-00735-DAD-SAB (PC), 2018
WL 306666, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018) (upholding Bivens Eighth Amendment claims against some
officials based on allegations that they failed to protect the plaintiff from substantial risk of serious
harm by an inmate, but dismissing claims against other officials based on insufficient allegations);
Ho v. Jett, No. 13-cv-245 (DWF/LIB), 2014 WL 991113, at *4–6 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2013) (upholding
Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against prison officials who ignored explicit requests for medical
attention immediately following a sexual assault, but dismissing claims against other officials based
on absence of factual allegations indicating that they actually knew of risk of assault and deliberately
ignored it). But see, e.g., Millbrook v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 615 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(dismissing Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against officials based, inter alas, on absence of
allegations about the officer’s role in the alleged assault).
167. See, e.g., Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015) (upholding Eighth
Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on prison officials’ deliberate indifference to risk of sexual
assault and holding that “actual knowledge” can be proven by “circumstantial evidence that a risk
was so obvious that it had to have been known”); Hostetler v. Green, 323 Fed. App’x. 653, 656–59
(10th Cir. 2009) (applying Eighth Amendment analysis to pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to substantial risk of
sexual assault by fellow prisoners and rejecting qualified immunity challenge); Tafoya v. Salazar, 516
F.3d 912, 918–21 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
sheriff for alleged deliberate indifference to substantial risk of sexual assault); Renee v. Peralez, No.
7:16-CV-281, 2017 WL 3335989, at *8, *20 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) (upholding Eighth Amendment
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surprisingly, a number of decisions have rejected claims, determining the
factual allegations insufficient.168 Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment
should provide an analogy, and a basis for recovery, for sexual assault
committed by federal agents of those in immigration detention.
4.

Fifth Amendment Equal Protection

In addition to Fifth Amendment Due Process, Fourth Amendment
unlawful search, and Eighth Amendment theories, Bivens claims for
federal agents’ sexual assaults naturally should be recognized under
established equal protection doctrine. The Supreme Court has recognized
a Bivens claim based on a gender-based Equal Protection violation, so
equal protection claims involving sexual assault do not present a new legal
theory or area of law.169 In Davis v. Passman, a male congressperson
terminated his female deputy administrative assistant because, although
she was “able, energetic and a very hard worker,” he concluded “that it
was essential that the understudy to [his] Administrative Assistant be a
man.”170 Although the plaintiff had no statutory claim, she had a claim for
a constitutional violation because, in the absence of clear direction for an
issue to be addressed by a “coordinate political department,” the Court
would “presume” that courts enforce constitutional rights.171 The Court
drew on previous race discrimination claims, determined that the plaintiff
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on prison officials’ deliberate indifference to sexual assault by prison
guard and denial of request for medical attention following assault, and upholding claims based on
municipality’s failure to train, but granting qualified immunity to all defendants except those who
subjectively knew details of the assault); Ball v. Bailey, No. 7:15cv00003, 2015 WL 4591410, at *8–
9 (upholding Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on allegations that prison counselor
rubbed and kissed prisoner, grabbed genitals, asked him to show her his penis, rubbed his buttocks,
sent him sexually explicit photographs of herself, sent him love letters, performed oral sex on him,
and engaged in sexual intercourse with him over his objections); Ramos, 2015 WL 13157319, at *8–
10 (upholding Eighth Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against prison officials who were on notice
of risk that employee was engaging in sexual misconduct with prisoners, but dismissing claims against
other officials who took reasonable steps to mitigate risk). But see, e.g., Roberts v. Beard, No.
15cv1044-WQH-RBM, 2018 WL 4561379, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) (holding that a
defendant’s alleged “rub[bing] or touch[ing of] [Plaintiff’s] male organ” during a pat-down search
did not constitute Eighth Amendment violation).
168. See, e.g., Shorter v. United States, Civ. No. 17–8911 (RMB), 2018 WL 1734061, at *3–5
(D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2018) (denying transgender prisoner’s Bivens claim alleging Eighth Amendment
violations based on failed investigations of sexual assault, finding that allegations didn’t provide a
well-documented pattern of inmate sexual assaults at the prison, and did not establish defendants’
knowledge that there was an excessive risk that an inmate would commit such an attack, and further
noting that allegations would constitute a “new Bivens context”).
169. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
170. Id. at 230.
171. Id. at 242.
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had no other means to vindicate her rights, and upheld her claim of
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.172 It further upheld
her claim for damages, recognizing that damages relief would be
judicially manageable given the courts' extensive experience litigating
Title VII claims.173 The Court found no “special concerns counseling
hesitation,” since all government actors must be subject to federal law,
and acknowledged no congressional declaration prohibiting a remedy.174
The Court dismissed concerns that the federal courts would be deluged
with claims, since any plaintiff seeking relief would first have to establish
a violation, and, moreover, because “limitations . . . arising from
budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the way of the
recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles.”175 More
recently, courts have recognized equal protection as a basis for Bivens
claims in other post-Davis cases involving impermissible bias.176
Title VII Supreme Court case law recognizing sexual assault (as well
as harassment) as a form of impermissible sex discrimination lends
additional support to the easy conclusion that sexual assault by federal
officials also constitutes impermissible sex discrimination, and therefore,
an equal protection violation.177 Courts analyzing Bivens claims should
rely on the established case law applying Title VII standards to analyses
of equal protection claims in cases involving sexual assault and
harassment by state actors.178
172. See id. at 243–44.
173. Id. at 245.
174. Id. at 246–47.
175. Id. at 248.
176. For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a challenge asserting that the Trump
Administration’s ban of transgender people serving in the military violated Equal Protection, based
on Davis. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding the plaintiffs likely
to succeed in demonstrating that the military policy is unconstitutional; case sought injunctive relief,
not damages). The Ninth Circuit upheld a Bivens claim that FBI agents violated the equal protection
rights of two deceased Native American men based on allegations that they failed to conduct a
sufficiently thorough investigation of the deaths due to animus toward Native Americans, although
the decision predates Abbasi. See Cole v. Oravec, 465 F. App’x 687, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2012); see, e.g.,
Kwai Fun Wong v. Unites States, 373 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding Bivens claim by foreign
religious leader and organization based on allegations that adjustments in leader’s immigration status
were based on discriminatory animus). But see, e.g., infra notes 179–180 (discussing cases denying
claims).
177. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77, 82 (1998) (allegations
of sexual assault and threatened rape constituted sexual harassment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 60, 73 (1986) (allegations of sexual assault and forcible rape constituted sexual
harassment).
178. Courts addressing this question have grappled with how the Equal Protection Clause’s
requirement of proof of discrimination squares with Title VII’s authorization of claims based on both
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Nevertheless, a few decisions have dismissed Bivens claims based on
equal protection theories, either because the claims arose in military
contexts,179 or because they arose in settings factually distinguishable
from Davis and the plaintiffs had other available remedies.180 In a
concerning turn, at least one decision addressing an equal protection claim
based on a sexual assault by a state official invoked the very type of
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (unintentional discrimination).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–45 (1976) (requiring proof of discriminatory motive to
prevail in constitutional discrimination claims). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]exual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 756 (1998). Accordingly, other courts have applied Title VII standards to equal protection
sexual harassment claims without additional inquiry. See, e.g., Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97,
119–20 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Title VII standards and also analyzing supervisory liability after
Iqbal); Jackson v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 643 F. App’x 889, 891 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that “because
the elements and analysis of a sexual harassment claim is identical under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause, [the court] jointly analyze[d] both claims under the applicable Title VII law.”);
Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The law is well established that both
Title VII and section 1983 could support . . . plaintiff’s claims, for sexual harassment . . . .”); Bator v.
State, 39 F.3d 1021, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Title VII standards and recognizing that the
constitution prohibits sexual harassment). But see, e.g., Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 902–03 (7th
Cir. 2007) (applying Title VII standards and requiring proof of discriminatory intent); Bohen v. City
of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186–87 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding the same). See also TAYLOR
FLYNN, Federal Equal Protection, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 15-1, 15-1 n.15 (Christine M. Duffy et
al. eds., 2014), https://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.googl
e.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1308&context=facschol [https://perma.cc/K2FH-TTRX] (discussing
application of Title VII standards to constitutional sex discrimination claims).
179. See, e.g., Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting Bivens claim
alleging that sexual assault at military training institution violated equal protection; injuries based on
“special factors” counseling abstention); Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (refusing
to imply a Bivens action based on sexual assault problems in the military; concerns that implying a
remedy would “require military leaders to defend their professional management choices,” counsel
against authorizing a remedy); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Bivens
claim based on constitutional violations arising from military service).
180. See, e.g., Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 805 F.3d 398, 403, 404 (2d Cir. 2015) (declining
to adopt categorical rule precluding Bivens claim in action by employee of federal contractor, but
identifying “special factors” counseling hesitation based in part on availability of claim under
Administrative Procedure Act); Morgan v. Shivers, No. 1:14-cv-7921-GHW, 2018 WL 618451, at
*5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018) (dismissing pre-trial detainee’s Bivens claims, based, inter alia, on the
fact that it arose in the prison context, a context in which Congress has legislated); Leibelson v.
Collins, Civ. No. 5:15-cv-12863, 2017 WL 6614102, at *10–11 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 27, 2017)
(declining to uphold Fifth Amendment equal protection Bivens claims by transgender federal prisoner
against individual officers based on, inter alia, sexual assault during strip search, refusal to provide
prisoner with hygiene and cleaning supplies, threats and derogatory slurs, and failure to accommodate
complaints of being unable to eat in dining hall due to threat of sexual abuse by other inmates, given
limited case law analyzing equal protection claims against federal prison officials and the plaintiff’s
active pursuit of FTCA claim); Patrick v. Adjusters Int’l, 16-CV-2789 (WFK) (PK), 2017 WL
6521251, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017) (distinguishing case from Davis because the plaintiff
was not a federal employee; court found insufficient facts to support claims under New York State
and New York City human rights law).
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outdated stereotype outlawed by the Equal Protection Clause. In Ramos v.
Swatzel,181 the federal district court rejected a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
equal protection claim against the guard who sexually assaulted her and
other officials, reasoning that nothing in the record indicated that the
guard’s feelings were “based on anything but a personal attraction to
[Plaintiffs],” and that there was no indication of an official policy
sanctioning sexual assault of prisoners.182 This reasoning ignores modern
understandings that any such relationship would be inappropriate due to
the power imbalance between them.183
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the Bivens doctrine provides no
recourse against the federal government itself for sexual assault
committed by its officials and provides an uncertain remedy against
federal officials for sexual assaults they commit, given recent cramped
interpretations of the doctrine. This liability scheme contrasts sharply with
longstanding doctrine and emerging accountability norms for sexual
assault committed at work.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS RECOURSE FOR GENDER VIOLENCE IN
EMPLOYMENT
The body of case law decided under Title VII offers the most in-depth
analyses of gender violence, including sexual assault, as a civil rights
violation. Courts uniformly recognize that institutions hold responsibility for
eliminating discrimination, including gender violence, from the workplace,
notwithstanding differences about the precise contours of the scope of
liability. The landmark 1986 case, Meritor v. Vinson,184 in which the Supreme
Court declared that sexual harassment at work was a form of sex
discrimination, derived from Mechelle Vinson’s claims that her boss
conditioned her employment on acceding to his demands for sexual favors,
which included sexual intercourse, unwanted touching, and forcible rape.185
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist, declared that
“[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis

181. No. CV 12–01089 BRO (SPx), 2015 WL 13157319 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015).
182. Id. at *12.
183. See, e.g., Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that
prisoners cannot consent to sexual relations with staff); infra note 261 (citing New York state law
clarifying that police officers cannot have sex with arrestees).
184. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
185. Id. at 60–62.
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of sex.”186 Twelve years later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc.,187 the Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, affirmed
that sexual assault constitutes impermissible sex discrimination.188 That case
involved a male shipworker’s allegations that he was subjected to ongoing
sexual harassment, including sexual assault and rape, by other male
employees.189 Since then, courts routinely have recognized that sexual assault
at work violates Title VII.190 Courts similarly have recognized that sexual
harassment encompasses a wide range of sexual and non-sexual conduct.191
Although the basic premise that sexual harassment is a form of
impermissible discrimination has not been challenged, the scope of
liability remains a source of sharp debate.192 The following discussion first
delineates the current parameters for liability, and then reviews reforms
advanced in the wake of the #MeToo revelations. This wave of reform

186. Id. at 64. While readily agreeing that sexual harassment constituted a form of sex
discrimination, the Court went on to opine about issues that continue to animate debates about the
reach of sexual harassment law today, namely, whether “economic” or “tangible” discrimination is
required and the standard for institutional liability. Id.
187. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
188. Id. at 80.
189. Id. at 77.
190. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533–34 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a single incident
of sexual assault would constitute impermissible sexual harassment); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d
1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “every rape committed in the employment setting is also
discrimination based on the employee’s sex”); Hush v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 233 F. Supp. 3d 598, 603–
04 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (holding that a single sexual assault of employee’s fourteen-year-old daughter
was severe enough to state claim for hostile environment); Winkler v. Progressive Bus. Publ’ns, 200
F. Supp. 3d 514, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that a single incident in which co-worker reached
underneath employee’s clothing and placed dollar bills between her bra strap and bare skin was
sufficiently severe to state hostile environment claim); E.E.O.C. v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 F.
Supp. 2d 1104, 1114 (D. Or. 2013) (holding that a single allegation of customer grabbing employee’s
breast was sufficiently severe to state a hostile environment claim); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 1172, 1179–80 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (upholding sexual harassment claim based on assault in
genital area); see also, e.g., Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding claim based on single incident of verbal assault, followed by repeated acts of harassment).
But see, e.g., Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a co-worker grabbing plaintiff’s breasts and behind and holding her cheeks and trying to kiss her
not sufficiently severe); Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a single
incident of co-worker forcing his hand underneath sweater and bra not sufficiently severe).
191. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 53 (arguing that sexual harassment wrongly has been understood
as limited to sexual conduct and that structural reform is needed to eliminate it).
192. For a summary of issues concerning the standard for liability, see, for example, Mark J. Stern,
Who’s to Blame for America’s Sexual Harassment Nightmare?, SLATE: JURIS. (Oct. 17, 2017, 7:02
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/10/blame_the_supreme_
court_for_america_s_sexual_harassment_nightmare.html [https://perma.cc/DS4D-FRVV]. For
critiques of current doctrine, see infra notes 199, 210 and accompanying text. For proposed reforms
to address concerns about current liability standards, see infra section III.B. and accompanying text.
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reflects emerging accountability norms for addressing and preventing
sexual harassment and assault.
A.

Current Doctrine

As those familiar with sexual harassment law know well, the Supreme
Court has defined actionable workplace sexual harassment as unwelcome
conduct committed because of sex, that is severe or pervasive enough to
objectively and subjectively alter the conditions of the target’s
employment.193 Once a plaintiff establishes that she was subject to sexual
harassment, the next question turns to whether the employer will be held
liable for the harassment. The Court has firmly opined that this question
would be determined by applying agency standards.194 The Supreme
Court has distinguished between direct, or “vicarious” liability, under
which an employer essentially is held strictly liable, and a negligence
standard, under which an employer is liable if it knew or should have
known of the harassment but failed to take remedial action.195
Accordingly, the Court has determined that employers are strictly liable
when a “supervisor” sexually harasses an employee, if the harassment
culminates in a “tangible employment action.”196 If the supervisor takes
no tangible employment action, the employer will avoid liability if it can
satisfy the affirmative defense that (1) they exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities the
employer provided.197 The Court purported to adopt this affirmative
defense to affect Title VII’s deterrent purpose; it posited that limiting
employer liability would encourage employers to create anti-harassment
policies and effective grievance procedures.198 Nevertheless, with over
193. See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). The Court has further reasoned that an
employee’s refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands itself constitutes a change in the terms
and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII; but that sexual harassment
“preceding” an adverse employment decision, such as unfulfilled threats, only will be actionable if
the conduct is severe or pervasive. See Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54
(1998).
194. Id. at 763–64; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
195. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424, 427 (2013).
196. Id. at 424. The Court reasoned that tangible employment actions require the imprimatur of the
employer and, therefore, become the act of the employer for purposes of Title VII. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 761–62.
197. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 807; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 765 (1998). The
employer bears the burden of establishing this affirmative defense. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
198. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; see also Vance, 570 U.S. at 430 (explaining that the affirmative
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thirty years of case law behind us, this standard has been widely criticized
as instead creating a compliance culture geared toward enabling
employers to avoid liability, rather than supporting meaningful efforts to
eliminate harassment and other forms of workplace discrimination.199
In addition to creating the affirmative defense for cases in which there
is no “tangible employment action,” the Court more recently has
addressed the question of when an employee is a “supervisor” or a coworker for vicarious liability purposes. In the 2013 Vance v. Ball State
University200 decision, the Supreme Court determined that an employee is
a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability “if he or she is
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against
the victim.”201 The Court sought to ensure that the “injury,” for instance,
the tangible employment action, could not have been inflicted absent the
agency relation.202 The Vance decision drew a strong dissent by Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, that would
hold employers liable for harassment by employees with authority to
direct an employee’s daily activity.203
For cases involving sexual harassment by someone other than a
“supervisor,” such as a co-worker or customer, an employer will be held
liable if it was negligent in its control over working conditions. In other
words, it would be liable if it knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.204
Presumably, this negligence standard is harder to satisfy than direct, or
automatic, liability under a respondeat superior theory.
In contrast to this rich case law grappling with the contours of
institutional accountability, courts consistently have concluded that
individuals cannot be held liable for sexual harassment or other
discrimination under Title VII.205 Courts have relied on Title VII’s
defense sought to accommodate agency principles of vicarious liability with Title VII’s policies of
“encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees.” (quoting Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 764)).
199. For a collection of critiques, see, for example, infra note 210. For proposed reforms, see infra
section III.B. and accompanying text.
200. 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
201. Vance, 570 U.S. at 424.
202. Id. at 429, 431–32.
203. Id. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 427–28; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
205. See, e.g., Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009); Van Horn v. Best
Buy Stores, 526 F.3d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir. 2008); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir.
2007); Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003); Glebocki v. City of
Chicago, 32 Fed. App’x. 149, 154 (7th Cir. 2002); Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177, 181
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statutory definition of “employer,” in concluding that the relief granted
under Title VII is against the employer, not against individual employees
whose actions would constitute discrimination in violation of the act.206
As one court reasoned, Title VII’s limited applicability to employers with
fifteen or more employees reflects its intent not to “burden” small entitles
with the costs of anti-discrimination litigation.207 The court further
reasoned that if small businesses would not face Title VII liability,
Congress certainly did not intend individual employees to face liability.208
Moreover, courts have invoked Congress’s amendment of Title VII to
include a graded damages scale depending on the size of the employer,
without any enumeration of damages for which an individual would be
held liable, to further support the conclusion that Title VII does not cover
individual liability.209
In summary, current anti-discrimination doctrine squarely holds
employers liable for sexual harassment, including sexual assault committed
by employees; however, the standards of liability have been narrowed over
time. By contrast, Title VII does not provide a remedy against an individual
employee, even if that individual committed sexual assault. Not
surprisingly, this complex liability scheme has been subject to critique, and
those critiques have sharpened in light of the #MeToo movement.
B.

#MeToo Movement and Calls for Reform

The #MeToo movement has spotlighted and prompted calls for reform
in law, policy, and cultural discourse. Scholars, activists, and
commentators have long critiqued the ways legal reform and cultural
change have fallen short of the promise of eliminating inequality at work;

(4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours, 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir.
1996); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991
F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); MAYA RAGHU & JOANNA SURIANI, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.,
#METOOWHATNEXT: STRENGTHENING WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT PROTECTIONS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY,
3–4
(2017)
[hereinafter
Raghu
&
Suriani],
available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/committee/MeTooStrengthening-Workplace-Sexual-Harassment-Protections.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TPK-63TA] (reviewing state anti-discrimination laws permitting sexual
harassment suits against individual harassers).
206. See, e.g., Fantini, 557 F.3d at 28 (noting Title VII’s statutory definition of “employer” as “a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any
agent of such a person”).
207. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30–31.
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in fact, many have argued that legal reform has instead served to
perpetuate inequality.210 Indeed, that sexual harassment on the job persists
over thirty years since the Meritor v. Vinson decision, confirms that law,
or at least the legal frameworks embodied in current anti-discrimination
laws, have had limited results. Structural reforms, including laws and
policies directed to ending sex segregation and inequality, discrimination
based on race, sexual orientation, gender identity, and national origin,
must be a part of a comprehensive reform agenda.211
The #MeToo movement has prompted widespread reflection on what
policies and practices best reduce and prevent harassment at work. Social
scientists and management experts identify coordinated and
210. For critiques of current employment discrimination frameworks, see, for example, ELLEN
BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON & LAURA B. NEILSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2017) (identifying flaws in employment
discrimination frameworks and recommending proposals for reform); LAUREN B. EDELMAN,
WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS (2016) [hereinafter
Working Law] (positing reasons why anti-discrimination law has failed to eliminate workplace
inequality); TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW (2017) (arguing that judges interpret antidiscrimination law to protect employers); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must
Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN L.
REV. ONLINE 62 (2018) (arguing that current approaches to training should be legally irrelevant for
liability purposes and urging doctrinal incentives for transformative prevention efforts); Joanna L.
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual
Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Culture of Compliance] (arguing
that legal rules such as the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense operate to privilege technical
compliance rather than successful prevention regimes); Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward,
Looking Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1047 n.112 (2015)
[hereinafter Moving Forward] (citing sources critiquing sexual harassment law’s inefficacy); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Companion Essay, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo
Movement, 128 YALE L.J. (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/what-about-ustoo
[https://perma.cc/KW4B-UJ4Y] (arguing that persistent racial biases reflected in the #MeToo
movement support doctrinal changes accounting for complainants’ intersectional and
multidimensional identities); Lauren B. Edelman, What’s the Point of Sexual Harassment Training?
Often,
to
Protect
Employers,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Nov.
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/whats-the-point-of-sexual-harassment-training-often-toprotect-employers/2017/11/17/18cd631e-c97c-11e7-aa9654417592cf72_story.html?utm_term=
.2af86da7eafc [https://perma.cc/DFH3-NMNU] [hereinafter What’s the Point] (arguing that courts
often fail to distinguish between meaningful compliance efforts and symbolic policies and procedures
aimed at reducing liability).
211. See, e.g., ACLU ET AL., A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO ELIMINATE WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES (2018) [hereinafter Call for Legislative Action],
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/workplace_harassment_legislative_principle
s_10.15.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VYX-FWHE] (constituting a blueprint for reform signed by over
fifty organizations); Schultz, Open Letter, supra note 14, at 17 (“[B]roader reforms are needed to
address the conditions in which harassment flourishes . . . .”); Jocelyn Frye, How to Combat Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2017, 9:02 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2017/10/19/441046/combat-sexualharassment-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/6ADL-3NQS].
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comprehensive approaches that aim to transform organizational culture as
best practices.212 Institutional leadership making clear that harassment
will not be tolerated is a core component of effective prevention efforts.213
Comprehensive and holistic bias elimination efforts should include
regular, data-driven training with ongoing evaluations, as well as regular
and anonymous climate surveys, along with efforts to integrate
traditionally underrepresented groups throughout the organization.214
Organizational culture and commitment to accountability by both
institutions and individuals play a central role in determining whether
sexual harassment will be tolerated at work.215
Law reform should complement management and cultural strategies to
reduce and eliminate sexual harassment, assault, and other forms of bias.
Reform proposals offer a window into emerging accountability norms.
While law reform proposals vary in their focus, they share demands for
increased accountability, for strengthening civil rights protections and for
212. For example, the EEOC’s Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace
concluded, inter alia, after a comprehensive review of social science studies, that stopping and
preventing harassment “starts at the top” and that “leadership and accountability are critical.” See
EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11; infra Part III. Other experts concur. See, e.g., Susan BisomRapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Transformative Education and
Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 64, 74 (2018) (calling for comprehensive approaches aimed
at transforming organizational culture); Vicki J. Magley & Joanna L. Grossman, Do Sexual
Harassment Prevention Trainings Really Work?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-sexual-harassment-prevention-trainings-reallywork/ [https://perma.cc/LF3M-4G39] (reviewing studies and concluding, inter alia, that
“[i]nstitutional culture change is needed”); Brendan L. Smith, What it Really Takes to Stop Sexual
Harassment, 49 APA MONITOR 36 (Feb. 2018), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/02/sexualharassment.aspx [https://perma.cc/D6UT-KF63] (same); see also THE NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WOMEN: CLIMATE, CULTURE AND CONSEQUENCES IN ACADEMIC SCIENCES,
ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE 171 (Paula A. Johnson et al. eds., 2018)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK507206/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK507206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7W4U-K43L] (concluding that, inter alia, a person is less likely to engage in
harassing behaviors in an organizational environment that has strong, clear, transparent consequences
for harassment).
213. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 210, ch. 6 (highlighting the importance of organizations in
perpetuating, and, preventing, discrimination); Frye, supra note 211 (underscoring importance of
leadership making clear that harassment is neither tolerated nor acceptable); Joan C. Williams et al.,
What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV.
139, 153 (citing norm that employers should not tolerate sexual harassment as “the norm that has []
changed most dramatically" in the wake of the #MeToo movement).
214. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 212, at 64, 73–75, 74 n.81.
215. See, e.g., Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 210, at 37–38 (reviewing studies);
Lucy Marcus, Why #MeToo is the Beginning of a Culture of Accountability, WORLD ECON. F. (Feb.
22, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/the-sexual-harassment-reckoning
[https://perma.cc/6MSV-KFVU] (underscoring leaders’ “obligation of stewardship,” which includes,
“implementing credible measures to ensure that colleagues or employees are not abusing their power
inside or outside the office, and holding accountable those who bring the company into disrepute”).
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reinforcing clear institutional commitments to preventing sexual
harassment and creating strong and meaningful avenues for redress when
it occurs.216 Potential exposure to liability motivates employers to adopt
workplace policies and practices to prevent sexual harassment and drives
the direction of those policies.217 The law therefore should be aligned with
policies and practices that promote both prevention and accountability,
and that actually reduce harassment.218
The #MeToo movement has spurred a flurry of proposed and enacted
legislative reform. For example, in the U.S. Congress, Senator Patty Murray
and Representative Katherine Clark introduced the BE HEARD in the
Workplace Act, which would expand protections for workers and safeguard
existing antidiscrimination laws and protections.219 States have introduced,
and have enacted, an unprecedented amount of sexual harassment

216. For example, the Yale Law Journal and Stanford Law Review Online published companion
pieces offering critical insights from a dozen scholars on the ways sexual harassment produces and is
produced by broader forms of inequality. See Companion Essay, #MeToo and the Future of Sexual
Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J. (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/collection/MeToo
[https://perma.cc/4WDM-G7LG]; #MeToo, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE: METOO SYMP. (2018),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/metoo-symposium/
[https://perma.cc/97BQ-C43R].
The
Stanford Law Review Online starts with an Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Law Scholars authored by Vicki Schultz, which enumerates ten principles with over
sixty specific legal reform proposals, some of which are discussed here. See Schultz, Open Letter,
supra note 14. Advocates join this call for legislative action with calls for reforms aimed at eliminating
workplace harassment. See Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 1; Raghu & Suriani, supra
note 205. International efforts similarly call for strong measures to eliminate workplace sexual
harassment and violence. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, LIC., 107/V/1, ENDING VIOLENCE AND
HARASSMENT AGAINST WOMEN AND MEN IN THE WORLD OF WORK: REPORT V (2018),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_553577.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XHH-PEZM]
(summarizing reforms in the world of work globally).
217. See, e.g., EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11 (emphasizing importance of widespread
commitment to a diverse, inclusive and respectful workplace and strong and meaningful
accountability systems); see also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 212, at 74; Joanna L. Grossman, The
Aftermath
of
the
#MeToo
Movement,
VERDICT
(June
26,
2018),
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/06/26/the-aftermath-of-the-metoo-movement
[https://perma.cc/9ZFP-BYHH]; Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 210, at 19.
218. See e.g., Edelman, supra note 210 (urging that employers “hold managers accountable for
ensuring that their units are harassment-free – with compensation reflecting their success in doing
so”).
219. BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. (2019) (setting forth
comprehensive legislation, inter alia, requiring nondiscrimination policies, research and reports,
expanding covered employees and available remedies, addressing liability standards, prohibiting
nondisclosure agreements and mandatory arbitration, providing funding for prevention programs and
legal representation for low income workers); Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing
Accountability and Rejecting Discrimination in the Workplace Act, S. 1082, 116th Cong. (2019)
(same).
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legislation.220 Many of these reforms address workplace policies and
practices and underscore the critical role of institutional actors (such as
employers) in preventing sexual harassment and discrimination.221 These
include laws requiring employers to adopt and implement sexual
harassment policies,222 laws mandating and improving training programs

220. See, e.g., Stephanie Scharf, Chair, Comm’n on Women in the Profession, A.B.A RES. 302
(2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/women/2018_mm_302.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PV4-X7PT] (urging all employers, and specifically employers in the legal
profession, to adopt and enforce anti-harassment policies); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS &
SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC AT COLUMBIA LAW SCH., COMBATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 2017 PUBLIC HEARING
TESTIMONY
(2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/SexHarass_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS87-QKS8] (discussing proposed reforms); ANDREA JOHNSON, MAYA RAGHU &
RAMYA SEKARAN, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., #METOO ONE YEAR LATER: PROGRESS IN
CATALYZING CHANGE TO END WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (2019), https://nwlcciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/MeToo-Factsheet-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4AJQ-KA5F] (summarizing state legislative advances); Legislation on Sexual
Harassment in the Legislature: 2018 Legislation, NCSL (Feb. 11, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2018-legislative-sexual-harassmentlegislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/EFD8-98QW] (reporting as of June 2018 that over thirty-two states
have introduced over 125 pieces of legislation).
221. See, e.g., Frye, supra note 211; Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 4.
222. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 807(1), (2) (2017), http://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/2
6/title26sec807.html [https://perma.cc/MRK8-FUWY] (requiring posting and employee notification of
information about sexual harassment laws); H.R. 2148 § 101; H.B. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2019),
http://src.bna.com/Bsr [https://perma.cc/7NR2-UXGL] (amending section 711A(f) of the Delaware Code to
require the Department of Labor to create an information sheet on sexual harassment with specified
requirements and requiring all employers to distribute it to all new employees and to existing employees within
six months of the Act’s effective date); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-G (1) (Consol. 2018) (requiring all New York
employers to adopt a sexual harassment prevention policy that meets proscribed minimum standards); H.R. 524,
2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018), https://legiscan.com/LA/text/HB524/2018 [https://perma.cc/C4G8-6UW2]
(revising title 42, section 342 of the Louisiana, Revised Statutes to require policies prohibiting sexual
harassment); Combatting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, N.Y. ST. (2019)
https://www.ny.gov/programs/combating-sexual-harassment-workplace
[https://perma.cc/B4T7-TGEP]
(providing resources for employers and workers).
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for employees,223 and laws requiring disclosure of the number of sexual
harassment complaints filed and the outcome of those complaints.224
Other proposals would improve reporting procedures for legislators
and others working in public office.225 Some would require elected
officials to use private, and not public, funds, to pay for settlements of
discrimination and harassment lawsuits.226
Other reforms would strengthen institutional accountability and
respond to concerns that Title VII’s current framework does not
adequately hold employers accountable for sexual harassment. These

223. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 807(3)–(5) (2019) (requiring workplaces with fifteen or
more employees to conduct anti-sexual harassment education and training programs for all new
employees within one year of commencement of employment, and setting standards for compliance
and enforcement); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-G(2) (2019) (requiring department of labor to produce a
model sexual harassment prevention training program, consistent with specified criterion and
requiring all employers to use the model program or an equivalent and provide it to all employees
annually); H.R. 2148 § 102 (requiring EEOC to promulgate regulations that would require employers
to provide training regarding discrimination and harassment to employees and supervisors); S. 1300,
2018 Leg., ch. 955 (Cal. 2018) (adding “bystander intervention training” to the sexual harassment
training already required by California law); S.B. 1343, 2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1343
[https://perma.cc/H6F3-QMBC] (inter alia, extending anti-sexual harassment training requirements
to employers with five or more—as opposed to fifty or more employees); Del. Gen. Assemb. H.R.
360 (Del. 2018), https://src.bna.com/Bsr [https://perma.cc/R9VC-V8PQ] (amending section 711A(g)
of the Delaware Code to require employers with fifty or more employees in Delaware to provide
specified sexual harassment prevention training to all new employees within a year and to existing
employees every two years); La. H.R. 524, 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 524) (revising chapter 42, section
343 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes to require public employees to be trained on preventing sexual
harassment); Combatting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, N.Y. STATE (2019)
https://www.ny.gov/programs/combating-sexual-harassment-workplace
[https://perma.cc/B4T7TGEP] (citing resources for employers, including model training programs, videos and webinars).
224. See, e.g., La. H.R. 524, 2018 Reg. Sess. (La. 2018) (revising chapter 42, section 344 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes, to require each government agency to compile an annual report including,
inter alia, the number of public employees who have completed training requirements, the number of
sexual harassment complaints filed, the number of complaints resulting in a finding that sexual
harassment occurred, the number resulting in discipline or corrective action, the amount of time it
took to resolve each complaint, the number of cases settled and the total monetary amount paid in
settlements, and the amount paid for attorneys’ fees and other litigation related expenses).
225. A number of reforms focus on creating more meaningful remedies for those harassed by
legislative staff. See, e.g., BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 112 (2019)
(requiring study and report concerning harassment among federal employees); MeToo Congress Act,
H.R. 4396, 115th Cong. (2017) (reforming procedures for investigating and resolving allegations of,
inter alia, sexual harassment of employees of legislative offices); Chief Judges Announce Adoption
of Workplace Conduct Policies, U.S. CTS. D.C. CIR. (Nov. 28, 2018), http://src.bna.com/Dym
[https://perma.cc/KDR3-U2QS] (announcing new workplace policies and procedures for federal
courts, including workplace relations coordinators, and other policy changes to address sexual
harassment and other workplace misconduct).
226. See, e.g., Congressional Harassment Reform Act, S. 2236, 115th Cong. § 215 (2017) (creating
personal liability of members of Congress).

08 - Goldscheid (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

1684

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/16/2020 3:51 PM

[Vol. 94:1639

reforms might be grouped into reforms that strengthen institutional and
individual accountability, respectively. Proposals to better hold
institutions accountable include reforms to ensure that all working people
are protected against harassment and discrimination. For example, some
proposals address the fact that many workers who are subjected to
harassment work in settings that are not covered by Title VII because their
employer employs fewer than fifteen employees.227 Some state and local
reforms have already enacted lower thresholds; for example, New York
City and New York State amended their laws governing sexual
harassment to apply to all employees, regardless of size.228
To strengthen accountability, some recently-enacted state laws and
pending proposals address the definition of who is an “employee.”229
These proposals would re-classify “independent contractors” and others
traditionally considered “non-employees” to bring them within the
coverage of sexual harassment and other anti-discrimination laws. Many
employees who are vulnerable to harassment, including contractors,
freelancers, home healthcare workers and domestic workers, often are
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2012) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”); see e.g., H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 202
(amending Title VII to apply to all employers with one or more employees); Call for Legislative
Action, supra note 211, at 2 (calling on Congress to extend workplace civil rights protections for all
individuals in workplaces with one or more employees); Schultz, Open Letter, supra note 14, at 32
nn.53–55 and accompanying text (describing heightened vulnerability for those, such as hotel maids,
private housekeepers, agricultural workers, waitresses and personal assistants, who may be
particularly vulnerable to unchecked harassment and whose employers may not be subject to
Title VII); id. at 44 (discussing categories of workers not covered by Title VII); see also Raghu &
Suriani, supra note 205, at 2 (arguing that anti-discrimination laws should apply regardless of the size
of the employers and listing states with anti-discrimination laws that cover employers with one or
more employees).
228. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (2018) (defining “employer” as those with four or more
employees, except with respect to sexual harassment, where “employer” shall include “all employers
within the state”); Int. No. 657-A, 2019 Leg. (N.Y. 2019) (amending Section 8-102(5) of the New
York City Human Rights Law Administrative Code to apply provisions related to gender-based
discrimination to all employers, regardless of the number of employees).
229. See, e.g., H.R. 2148 § 301, 116th Cong. (2019); Cal. S.B. 1300, ch. 955 (Cal. 2018) (amending
various provisions of the California Government Code relating to employment to, inter alia, prohibit
sexual harassment by nonemployees if the employer, or its agents or supervisors, knew or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action); Del. H.R. 360
(2019) (amending title 19, section 711A(b) to apply sexual harassment provisions to state employees,
unpaid interns, applicants, joint employees, apprentices, and individuals who work for employment
agencies); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-D (Consol. 2018) (extending anti-sexual harassment provisions to
non-employees in an employer’s workplace when the employer, its agents or supervisors knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action);
Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 2 (calling on Congress to strengthen workplace civil
rights protections against harassment and discrimination for independent contractors, interns,
graduate students, and guest worker recruits); Raghu & Suriani, supra note 205, at 2 (citing state laws
that cover independent contractors).
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classified as independent contractors, and therefore lack recourse when
they are subject to harassment or other discriminatory practices at work.
These proposals would address that critical gap.
Other reforms address the standards for liability. So, for example, some
states have removed the “severe or pervasive” standard for liability.230
Other reforms address the ramifications of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative
defense and the Vance decisions, discussed above.231 Putting to the side for
the moment which of the proposed reforms best addresses meaningful
accountability, the proposals reflect a shared view that the current
institutional liability scheme established by the severe or pervasive
standard, the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense and the Vance definition
of “supervisor” combine to allow many cases to fall outside the purview of
current federal anti-discrimination laws. They reflect widespread concern
that the current accountability scheme promotes superficial compliance

230. See, e.g., S. 3817, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S. 7083, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019);
Cal. S. 1300 (declaring that “harassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work
environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work in a place free of discrimination
when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so
as to disrupt the victim’s emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim’s ability to perform
the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim’s personal sense of wellbeing”).
231. See, e.g., supra notes 195–204; Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 3 (calling on
Congress, inter alia, to extend the statute of limitations for filing discrimination complaints with the
EEOC, defining “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability as those who direct employees’ daily
activities, removing caps on compensatory damages, correct unduly restrictive interpretations of the
“severe or pervasive” standard). Some proposals would restore the legal standard established by case
law before the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance. See, e.g., H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 206); Fair
Employment Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 4152, 115th Cong. (2017). Others would go further, for
example, holding employers accountable under the same standards in which they are responsible for
other types of discrimination, thus eliminating inquiries into the status of the harasser and essentially
imposing strict liability for sexual harassment on the job. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Two Very
Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1344
(2014) (arguing for a new Civil Rights Restoration Act that would hold employers strictly liable for
their employees’ discriminatory acts); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 210, at 71–72
(urging elimination of the Faragher/ Ellerth defense and arguing that automatic liability will produce
the same incentives as the defense but will only reward employers if their actions work); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 53, at 319–20 (same); David B. Oppenheimer, Twenty Years After
Faragher and Ellerth, Is it Time to Re-visit Strict Vicarious Liability for On-The-Job-Sexual
Harassment? (Sep. 19, 2018) (unpublished research paper) (on file with UC Berkeley Center on
Comparative Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252112
[https://perma.cc/FQE8-S6AE] (same); Schultz, Open Letter, supra note 14, at 9.1 (same); Joseph A.
Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that,
to address current difficulty of prevailing in workplace discrimination cases, discrimination should
not be subject to the Iqbal standard and that the fact of discrimination should be presumed). Under this view,
employers are “best positioned” to set standards for acceptable conduct in the workplace and therefore
should be liable for conduct that takes place at work. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 53, at 320.
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rather than meaningful accountability and is not sufficiently aligned with
best practices to effectively incentivize prevention.232
Another thread of reform urges that civil rights liability for sexual
harassment and assault should extend to the individuals who commit the
harassment.233 To promote both compensation for survivors and
deterrence on the part of those who would commit harm, both individuals
and institutions should be held liable for discrimination that they commit
or facilitate. Although some state and local anti-discrimination laws
provide for individual liability, and although some states’ civil rights laws
provide a remedy against those who commit gender motivated violence,234
that patchwork of laws is no substitute for uniform federal coverage.
Finally, reforms would modify related criteria associated with
obtaining relief.235 Proposals would prohibit or limit the enforceability of
non-disclosure agreements.236 They would prohibit mandatory arbitration,
though some have questioned the enforceability of those provisions.237
232. See, e.g., supra note 210 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g; Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 3; Grossman, Culture of Compliance,
supra note 210, at 71, 74; Raghu & Suriani, supra note 205, at 2.
234. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid & Rene Kathawala, State Civil Rights Remedies for Gender
Violence: A Tool for Accountability, 87 U. CINN. L. REV. 171 (2018).
235. See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 1300 (Sept. 30, 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1300 [https://perma.cc/Q7QJ-A8GU] (authorizing courts to
award reasonable attorney fees and costs, including expert witness fees, and prohibiting an award of
those costs to a prevailing defendant unless the court finds the action was “frivolous, unreasonable,
or groundless when brought or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so”); see
also Call for Legislative Action, supra note 211, at 2 (calling on Congress to prohibit non-disclosure
agreements, ensure informed consent regarding nondisclosure clauses in settlement agreements, and
to report the number and amount of claims settled involving harassment and discrimination).
236. See, e.g., H.R. 2148, supra note 219, § 302; S. 820, 2018 Leg. Cal. SB 820 (Sept. 30, 2018),
CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. 1001 (2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill
_id=201720180SB820 [https://perma.cc/ZPE4-LMCY] (prohibiting non-disclosure clauses in sexual
assault, Sexual harassment, and sex discrimination cases); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-B (Consol. 2018)
(prohibiting non-disclosure provision in sexual harassment settlement agreement unless complainant
complies with three-step process for memorializing that any non-disclosure provision is the
preference of the complainant).
237. See, e.g., H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 303; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (2018),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmStatutesText.aspx?article=gle&section=3715&ext=html&session=2019RS [https://perma.cc/T8ZL-SXTD] (prohibiting waiver of substantive
or procedural rights or remedies for sexual harassment claims, unless prohibited by federal law); N.Y.
C.P.L.R.
7515
(Consol.
2018),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVP/7515
[https://perma.cc/M2K6-4QL6] (prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses for sexual harassment
disputes in employment agreements unless inconsistent with federal law); Call for Legislative Action,
supra note 211, at 2. But see, e.g., Stephanie A. Scharf, Comm’n on Women in the Profession, A.B.A
RES. 300 (Aug. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_dele
gates/2018_am_300.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SKG-PM7S] (urging employers not to require mandatory
arbitration of sexual harassment claims); Larry R. Seegull & Jill S. Distler, Maryland’s Sexual
Harassment Disclosure Law Takes Effect Soon,
SHRM (Sept. 18, 2018),
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Notwithstanding differences about the specific triggers for liability,
this wave of reform efforts underscores the value, and importance, of
institutional commitments to ending sexual harassment. These proposed
reforms reflect the recognition that employers are responsible for
preventing sexual harassment and assault at work, and that they should be
held accountable for employees who commit sexual assault with the
imprimatur of the employer, and for their own negligence in knowingly
allowing harassment and assault to take place in their workplaces. This
view sharply contrasts with the federal government’s liability for sexual
assaults committed by its agents and other federal actors.
IV. COMPARING SCHEMES
This Part compares the liability scheme for sexual assaults by federal
agents with the accountability norms highlighted by the #MeToo
movement. It first analyzes how the respective schemes each address
institutional and individual accountability for gender violence, and then
addresses the rationales invoked to justify federal officials’ limited
liability. The comparison reveals how the justifications for limited
recovery against federal agents are out of step with policies and practices
recognized as preventing and eliminating gender violence.
A.

Institutional Accountability

The most glaring difference between the civil rights liability scheme
for gender violence at work as compared to the civil rights liability scheme
for gender violence committed by federal officials is the way the
respective approaches address the threshold question of institutional
accountability. Although federal workplace antidiscrimination law readily
recognizes that sexual harassment (which includes sexual assault)
constitutes impermissible sex discrimination and therefore violates
Title VII, no analogous federal statute provides relief for sexual assault
committed by federal agents; the Bivens doctrine has been held to
explicitly bar such direct institutional liability.238
In workplace cases, employers will be vicariously liable for sexual
harassment and assaults committed by supervisors under prescribed
circumstances and will be liable for sexual harassment and assaults
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-localupdates/pages/maryland-sexual-harassment-law-takes-effect-soon-.aspx
[https://perma.cc/46Q57UBC] (discussing Maryland’s disclosure law and questioning whether it would be pre-empted by
the Federal Arbitration Act given Supreme Court precedent favoring arbitration agreements).
238. See supra section II.B.
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committed by non-supervisory employees, co-workers, or customers if the
employer was negligent in allowing the harassment to occur.239 Although
the standard has narrowed in recent years,240 and although the prevailing
standards for liability have been critiqued,241 the principle that employers
should be liable for sexual harassment and assault as a violation of antidiscrimination norms is not seriously in question. Proposed reforms would
expand the circumstances in which employers would be held liable.242 By
contrast, civil rights actions against the federal government for sexual
harassment and assault committed by their employees or agents is
formally and flatly precluded under the Bivens doctrine.243
This threshold gap is deeply problematic, both practically and
symbolically. It leaves survivors without a clear path to relief from the
federal government itself. It means that the federal government, as an
employer, will not be held directly accountable as a civil rights matter, for
sexual assault committed by officials it employs. This is inconsistent with
case law recognizing that sex harassment and assault in federal
workplaces violates equal protection (as well as Title VII). It is also out
of step with emerging norms underscoring the importance of institutional
leadership in eliminating sexual assault and harassment as well as other
forms of bias.244
The fact that the federal government has the authority to indemnify
federal employees accused of constitutional wrongdoing does not
eviscerate the importance of formal acknowledgement of institutional
accountability.245 Although some accounts indicate that the government
regularly indemnifies officers for their wrongdoing, the government may
be less likely to indemnify those who are under criminal investigation or
prosecution.246 If that is the case, while the federal government may
239. See supra notes 194–204 and accompanying text.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 210–218 and accompanying text.
242. See supra section III.B.
243. See supra section II.B.
244. See, e.g., supra notes 212–218 and accompanying text.
245. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1) (2019) (authorizing the federal government to assume financial
responsibility for defense and indemnification of employees accused of wrongdoing).
246. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76–77, & 77 n.56 (1999) (arguing that individual
liability is a misnomer because the federal government will defend and indemnify federal employees
alleged to have committed constitutional torts, except where the employee is under criminal
investigation or prosecution); see also, e.g., Arkles, supra note 21, at 807 (arguing that the government
may refuse to indemnify prison staff who sexually abuse prisoners, citing, as an example, Dorsey v.
Givens, 209 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). But see generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 902–12 (2014) (surveying data from eighty-one jurisdictions
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indemnify officials whose negligence may have resulted in sexual
violence, it may not indemnify those who have committed the acts of
violence themselves. Regardless of how the government exercises its
discretionary indemnification authority, that discretionary and unreported
authority is no substitute for explicit and acknowledged accountability.
B.

Individual Accountability

In some ways, workplace and federal governmental accountability
standards reflect opposing limitations. While Title VII limits claims to
those brought against an institution, and precludes claims against an
individual, the Bivens doctrine does just the opposite, by precluding
claims against the federal government itself, while recognizing liability,
if at all, by the individual employee for his or her own actions.247
Nevertheless, the prospects for individual liability are limited, given the
narrowing scope of the Bivens doctrine and the growing application of
qualified immunity.
Although the respective approaches may reflect differences in the way
Title VII is drafted (focused on the employer) and the historic interpretation
of constitutional law (disfavoring implied rights of action), both approaches
fall short of meaningfully advancing accountability. The Bivens doctrine’s
rationale precluding institutional liability in order to prevent individuals
from avoiding responsibility is premised on a false distinction that the
prospect of institutional responsibility would preclude individual liability,
and therefore, would fail to deter wrongdoing.248 Similarly, the notion that
Title VII’s focus on employers should preclude individual liability does not
serve the overarching goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.
A meaningful accountability scheme would contemplate standards of
accountability for both institutional and individual actors.249 The two should
work hand in hand to ensure shared responsibility for eliminating
discrimination in employment and in federal functions.

and finding that law enforcement almost never pays for counsel, and virtually never contribute to
settlements or judgments, due to a combination of indemnification, reduction based on their limited
resources, or governmental decisions not to collect judgments).
247. See supra section IV.A.
248. See, e.g., infra notes 82–90 (discussing FDIC, rejecting respondeat superior liability based on
reasoning that allowing institutional liability would preclude individual accountability).
249. See Culture of Compliance, supra note 210, at 74; see also Paul S. Greenlaw & William H.
Port, Military Versus Civilian Judicial Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993 LAB. L.J. 368,
373 (1993) (noting that a military system, which allows individual liability but not entity liability,
may not provide sufficient incentives for military higher-ups to prevent harassment).
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Justifications for Limited Liability

A number of justifications have been advanced for the limited liability
scheme applicable to federal officials under the Bivens doctrine. This section
reviews and critiques the most salient justifications for limited recourse
against the federal government as they apply to cases of sexual assault.250
1.

Absence of Statutory Authority

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court reiterated its reluctance to imply a cause
of action where Congress has not acted.251 Indeed, the Court opined that
“[i]n most instances . . . the Legislature is in the better position to consider
if "‘the public interest would be served” by imposing a “new substantive
legal liability."'"252 This separation of powers concern has longstanding
roots.253 In Abbasi, the Supreme Court emphasized that the core question
in Bivens cases is “who should decide” whether to provide a damages
remedy: Congress or the courts.254 The Court decreed that the answer
“most often will be Congress,” and further opined that “separation-ofpowers principles are or should be central to the analysis.”255
Of course, nothing precludes Congress from responding to the
limitations of the Bivens doctrine by enacting a statutory remedy for
sexual assault and other constitutional violations committed by federal
officials. Indeed, Congress has done just that for violations of federal
rights by state officers.256 Some have suggested statutory reform as a
needed response to growing restrictions on government accountability.257

250. While some of these critiques may apply as well to Bivens actions arising in different factual
and legal contexts, those applications are beyond the scope of this paper.
251. 582 U.S. __, 1856–57, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (reasoning that Congress, not the courts, should
“most often” determine whether to provide for a damages remedy); see also supra notes 94–112.
252. Id. at 1857 (quotations omitted). The Court repeatedly rested its ruling on separation of powers
concerns that the availability of any remedy falls within the purview of Congress, not the Court; see
also id. at 1860–61, 1863.
253. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting);
id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting).
254. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
255. Id.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
257. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Demise of Merits-Based Adjudication in Post-9/11 National
Security Litigation, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1035, 1086 (2016) (suggesting that Congress enact an express
cause of action for violations of federal law by federal officers).
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2.

Federal Officials’ Policymaking Prerogatives

The related concern that Bivens actions should not become a vehicle
for making federal policy choices is another driving force behind the
courts' limitations on Bivens remedies. As the Supreme Court emphasized,
separation of powers requires policy decisions to be relegated to
Congress, not the courts.258 Yet the question of the federal government’s
liability for sexual assault committed by its agents does not raise the
concerns about policymaking that may be at issue in other cases. For
example, the Abbasi decision challenged high-level Executive Branch
policies relating to national security concerns.259 Granted, the conduct of
federal officers at the border arguably implicate national security
concerns, for example, in assessing the circumstances in which strip
searches may legally be conducted.260 However, there is simply no
analogous argument that sexual assaults by federal officers advances
federal policy. Indeed, recent legislation confirms what should be
obvious—that police officers are banned from having sex with people in
custody.261 Accordingly, concerns that litigation would require disclosure
of discussions leading to the formulation of national policy, simply do not
apply.262 Any policy-based concern here should favor outlawing sexual
assault; to that end, a damages remedy would align incentives with stated
policies deterring sexual assault.
3.

Deterrence

The Court has invoked the notion of deterrence in service of its
determination to preclude damages remedies against the federal
government itself, by reasoning that deterrence will be best served by
holding individuals liable for their own wrongdoing.263 However, that
reasoning may ring hollow since, as the preceding discussion makes clear,
the Bivens doctrine has evolved to preclude institutional accountability
and to render individual accountability for wrongdoing in a context at all

258. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
259. Id. at 1860–61.
260. See supra notes 144, 147–148 (describing Bivens claims based on strip searches).
261. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(J) (Consol. 2019); S. 7708, 2018 Leg. (N.Y. 2018),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s2857 [https://perma.cc/H7VK-UVHZ].
262. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–61.
263. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1994); see also Abbasi, 137
S. Ct. at 1860 (reasoning that, “Bivens is not designed to hold officers responsible for the acts of their
subordinates”).
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different from those previously recognized, uncertain at best.264
Moreover, even if held accountable, an individual might be indemnified
by the government.265 The combined effect renders the federal
government liable for civil rights violations, if at all, only for litigation
and indemnification costs, under discretionary and informal rules, and it
is uncertain, and perhaps unlikely, that individuals would be held liable.
As a result, the Bivens scheme is not likely to do much work to advance
the important goals of deterrence and prevention. Indeed, the Abbasi
decision, the Court’s most recent articulation of standards for individual
liability, while recognizing the “continued force” and even “necessity” of
Bivens claims in the search-and seizure context, focuses more on the
burden of costs of defense and indemnification, and on the time and
administrative costs associated with constitutional tort litigation, than on
any concern for prevention and deterrence.266
The resulting accountability scheme’s failure to reflect strong norms,
policies and processes for redressing abuse and discrimination contrasts
sharply with the accountability norms brought into focus by the #MeToo
movement. Experts conclude that best practices for prevention of
harassment and other forms of discrimination are strong policies
advancing institutional cultures touting respectful workplaces with clear
policies against bias, and with meaningful remedies against management
that fails to take action in light of known risks of discrimination and
against individuals who commit discriminatory acts when they occur.267
Leadership from the top is key. By contrast, the current liability scheme
under Bivens, which provides for no institutional accountability as a
formal matter, and for individual accountability under limited, and
uncertain circumstances, runs counter to that expert guidance.
Although the potential for liability alone will not eliminate sexual
harassment and other forms of discrimination, it is a core component of
meaningful accountability schemes, and should extend to both the
individual and the institution, for their respective roles in facilitating and
condoning the abuse.268 Both Title VII and the Bivens doctrine fall short
of best practices in this way. The Court’s reasoning about deterrence in
the Bivens context has incorrectly presumed that accountability operates
in a binary manner, against either the institution or the officer. In Carlson

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part II.
See supra notes 245–246 and accompanying text.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856–57.
See supra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.
See supra note 249.
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v. Green,269 the Court reasoned: “[b]ecause the Bivens remedy is
recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the
FTCA remedy against the United States. It is almost axiomatic that the
threat of damages has a deterrent effect.”270
The Court posited that government superiors would promulgate
corrective policies when an employee is found personally liable for
violations of a citizen’s constitutional rights, since “responsible superiors
are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc but also by concern
for the Government’s integrity.”271 Yet the Court cited no data to support
this conclusion. Similarly, in FDIC,272 the Court built on this binary
approach to accountability: “[i]f we were to imply a damages action
directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass
qualified immunity, there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to
bring damages actions against individual officers. Under [plaintiff’s]
regime, the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”273
Yet deterrence does not operate in this binary manner in other
accountability schemes. Tort law, for example, contemplates different
standards for liability depending on whether the wrongdoer committed an
intentional act, or was being held liable for negligence.274 Workplace antidiscrimination law similarly imposes different standards for liability
depending on whether the discrimination was deemed to be the act of the
employer itself or based on other employees’ negligence.275 The idea that
liability should run either against an institutional or against the individual
is not mandated by any legal principle, is not supported by social science,
and runs counter to best practices for prevention.
The fact that federal officials continue to commit sexual assault, as but
one example of discriminatory wrongdoing, suggests that the current
scheme is not doing the work it should to deter misconduct. The Court in
Bivens recognized that those acting with the power of the state possess “a
far greater capacity for harm” than private individuals committing the
same act.276 While this reasoning supports the availability of a damages
remedy against the individual, it need not preclude a remedy against the
269. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
270. Id. at 21.
271. Id.
272. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
273. Id. at 485.
274. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (discussing reasons tort law distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional
consequences and harms).
275. See supra notes 194–204.
276. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391–92 (1971).
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institution as well. Indeed, the gross disparity of power between federal
officials and others, as illustrated starkly in the power disparity between
border agents and immigrants, renders the need for strong deterrent
measures, in the form of institutional policies and accountability as well
as accountability for individuals who commit harm, all the more
important. The notion of insulating the government, but not individual
agents, for their respective roles in committing or facilitating sexual
assault, is particularly troubling, given that organizational culture is
driven from the “top,” and that potential liability informs management
practices. Not surprisingly, some commentators have endorsed the notion
that agencies should be held accountable for the costs of sexual assaults
by their employees as one means of holding institutions to account.277
4.

Financial Burden of Damages Remedies

Another concern driving the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence is the
potential impact of damages remedies on the public fisc. For example, in
Carlson, the Court invoked “responsible superiors[']” concern for the
“public fisc” in reasoning that supervisors would take appropriate actions
in response to wrongdoing if the individual wrongdoer was held to
account, so, presumably, a damages remedy would not be needed against
the institution.278 In FDIC, the Court rejected arguments seeking
institutional liability, based in part, on concerns that institutional liability
would be too costly for the federal government.279 The Court has invoked
concerns about costs in limiting liability by individual actors as well. For
example, in Abbasi, the Court cited the “burdens on government
employees who are sued personally,” and the “projected costs and
consequences to the Government itself,” in justifying limiting relief.280
Nevertheless, this argument proves too much, since concerns about
litigation costs, both in terms of disruption and monetary damages, could
be invoked to eviscerate the prospect of damages remedies entirely. While
litigation no doubt is burdensome, the unilateral focus on the burden on
277. Sisk, supra note 42, at 782–83 (proposing that having the responsible federal agent bear the
costs of a tort suit resulting from sexual assault by federal officials better addresses deterrence, citing
the “moralizing” impact of public claims of sexual violence).
278. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).
279. 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Ironically, the Court in Abbasi justified further limiting individuals’
liability for constitutional violations, in part, on the costs arising from indemnification. Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 582 U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017). The combined impact of these decisions seems to
reflect a preference for limiting liability, rather than a judgment about what approach would best deter
unconstitutional conduct.
280. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
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defendants erases the deep and lasting emotional and economic harms of
sexual assault and other constitutional violations. Indeed, courts have
recognized that cost may not be invoked to justify discrimination in at
least some other contexts.281 Since the potential for liability advances
accountability measures, the prudent response for those concerned about
preventing sexual assault and discrimination should instead be to allow a
remedy, and to take appropriate policy-based steps to eliminate sexual
assault as part of institutional culture.
CONCLUSION
The current moment of national reckoning with the pervasiveness of
sexual harassment and assault offers an opportunity for reflection on the
ways civil rights law has evolved across contexts. It prods us to consider
how well current doctrine is aligned with policies and practices designed
to prevent and reduce discrimination. Federal civil rights law flatly
prohibiting a direct remedy against the federal government for
constitutional violations is out of step with emerging understandings
underscoring the importance of strong leadership and policy proscriptions
of bias and discrimination. While reform is needed in both the
employment and federal governmental contexts, the comparison of the
state of current doctrine in both contexts at a minimum underscores the
need to hold the federal government to account for sexual assault and
other civil rights violations, committed in its name.

281. See Ernest F. III Lidge, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination Claim,
58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (explaining that the Court has rejected cost defenses in cases in which
an employer facially discriminates against all women because of the greater cost of employing them
as a group); see, e.g., Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (“[E]xtra cost of
employing members of one sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a
discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender.”).

